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Introduction
This is the fourth issue of the annual Review of Women’s Studies, published 
by the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University.  This issue 
features a rich selection recent research and writing by the Institute’s 
faculty and graduate students, as well as contributions from other scholars 
in Palestine and abroad that advance understanding of gender issues in 
Palestinian society. The editors are pleased to welcome  Dr. Rosemary 
Sayigh (Beirut, Lebanon) as a contributor to this issue of the Review 
with a thought-provoking article in our English section that considers 
the stories of “home” told by Palestinian women in refugee camps in 
Lebanon;  Sayigh  urges  a re-conceptualization of home as a domain of 
history and nation-making.  Her call for an engaged and participatory 
methodology – as well as a collective research project – reﬂects long-
standing concerns of the Institute and is very welcome.  Also in the 
English section, Lisa Taraki introduces one of the Institute’s collective 
projects – Three Communities in Wartime—in her consideration of 
community, identity and place in the three Ramallah-area communities 
under study.
A continued engagement with the achievements, problems and 
prospects of the Palestinian women’s movement is reﬂected in articles
in the Arabic section by Eileen Kuttab and Nida Abu Awwad and Janan 
Abdu Makhoul. The latter sheds light on feminist initiatives inside the 
Green Line.  Hadeel Rizk-Qazzaz presents a fascinating analysis in the 
English section of training programs by women’s NGOs for women 
candidates to local and parliamentary elections in Palestine.  
In a project for the Institute, Hanan Halabi and Penny Johnson contribute 
two articles in the English section on unmarried women in Palestine, 
a hitherto neglected subject.  Halabi uses new statistics from the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics to proﬁle unmarried women and
Johnson uses interviews to examine the operation of choice, agency and 
responsibilities in the lives of unmarried women. :
The range of themes addressed by Institute graduate students in their 
theses and  seminar papers is well-represented in the Arabic section, from 
power and authority within Palestinian families (Ayman Abd el Majeed) 
to women and inheritance (Aiyad Aiyash) to Palestinian women’s legal 
discourse (Maha Mustakim Nassar) to the implementation of the health 
law (Suhaila Qara’een) to an analysis of Arab states’ reservations to 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(Yusra Muhammed)
A new feature in the English section, Point of Debate, invites discussion 
on a major human rights report on violence against Palestinian women 
and girls, while a report of a recent Institute workshop for the Arab 
Families Working Group provides an account of lively interventions and 
discussion on re-thinking Arab families.
The editors and the Institute as a whole would like to add their voices to the 
widespread protest in Palestinian society over an edict from the Ministry 
of Education banning an important book on Palestinian folklore from 
school libraries. Speak Bird, Speak Again, co-authored by our colleague 
at Birzeit University Dr. Sharif Kanaana and Dr. Ibrahim Muhawwi, is 
an indispensable resource for students to understand their heritage and 
identity as Palestinians.    Its folktales are the stories told by Palestinian 
women for generations – literally the voices of our grandmothers – and 
these voices must not be silenced.   
The Editors
Ramallah,  March 2007
A R T I C L E S

Palestinian refugee women’s stories of 
home and homelessness:
Towards A New Research Agenda
Rosemary Sayigh
The Institute of Women’s Studies was pleased to 
host Dr. Rosemary Sayigh as a visiting fellow in the 
spring of 2006.  Sayigh’s pioneering work on the 
histories and esperiences of Palestinians  in refugee 
camps in Lebanon, and particularly her use of oral 
marratives to recover the histories of Palestinian 
women, had long  been inspiring and guiding for 
the Institute’s researchers, as well as many others in 
Palestine and elsewhere. Sayigh taught a graduate 
seminar in gender and oral history during her 
residence at the Institute.  At the end of her stay, 
she presented an ambitious “research proposal” 
centered on camp refugee women’s stories of 
“home.” The proposal was of great interest both 
for its participatory, engaged methodology and 
for its re-conceptualization of the domestic terrain 
as a domain of history and of the re-making of 
Palestine.  Sayigh kindly re-worked her presentation 
for inclusion in the Review; she and the editors 
welcome readers’ responses. 
Introduction
In 2005 a small group of Palestinian activists in Beirut met to plan a 
photo book about refugee housing in Bourj al-Barajneh camp (in the 
suburbs of Beirut). Our idea was to photograph homes through the eyes 
of women-occupants, to focus on the views and aspects of homes that 
women wanted to draw attention to, and at the same time to record their 
stories about this and other homes they had maintained. In this way we 
would achieve a visual and audio record of refugee homes in one camp 
in Lebanon from the perspective of women. The project was discussed 
with the Palestinian Women’s Humanitarian Organisation (PWHO), a 
local NGO that carries out house repairs in Bourj al-Barajneh for people 
who cannot afford them. 
This project did not get beyond discussion meetings, but an artist 
among us took up the idea in a different way, by using ‘home’ as a topic 
for weekly sessions of a club for people over 60 (run by the PWHO). 
Those who attend the over-60s club are mainly women, and Amy 
Trabka – the artist – presented them with the idea of a ‘treasure box’ 
that each would construct as a legacy to pass on to their daughters, ﬁlled
with visual representations of things connected to home. Each week 
different materials were used, and different parts of the home evoked. At 
the end of the year, an exhibition was produced, including a few voice 
recordings, all of which have been archived. An American-Palestinian 
artist who attended some of the sessions -- Doris Bittar – made visits 
to individual homes. She asked women to point out to her objects and 
parts of the home that were particularly dear to them,  photographed and 
elaborated them through framing so that they became works of art.1 I 
was interested in Doris’s stories of  women – usually widows – who had 
put energy and creativity into re-modelling and decorating their homes. 
Pride in their work in aestheticizing the home, and their attachment 
to particular objects within or outside the home, suggested expanding 
accepted Western feminist notions of ‘domestic labour’ by exploring it 
in an Arab milieu through women’s recollections. 
1 More of these works can be seen at www.dorisbittar.com
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Khadija and her roof garden, Bourj el Barajneh      Photo:Doris Bittar
One can imagine several values – theoretical, ideological, political -- that 
would accumulate through such a research strategy. Simpliﬁed notions
of ‘imprisoned’ Arab Muslim women versus ‘liberated’ Western women 
could be explored, subverted, and reﬁned through ‘thick’ descriptions,
woman-authored, of how women living in Palestinian refugee camps 
experienced and negotiated their domestic role, with what degrees of 
pride, negation or modiﬁcation. At the level of ideology, this would both
challenge Orientalist constructions of Arab/Muslim women as essentially 
‘different’ from Western women, particularly as prisoners of a ‘domestic 
sphere’narrowly conceived as separate from, and inferior to, the ‘public 
sphere,2 and still at the ideological level, but directed towards Palestinian 
feminist scholars, such research potentially lifts Palestinian refugee 
 2 This image has accompanied Western penetration of Arab, Muslim and other world regions, creating 
an imaginary liberationist mission that embraced missionaries and educators as well as soldiers and 
administrators. See McClintock, Mufti and Shohat 1997.
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women’s lives out of the ideological ‘box’ of West/East ‘difference’ 
and re-sets them in a context of afﬁliation with ‘women of colour’ who,
whether in countries of the South or as immigrants in the developed 
West, are consolidating around a refusal to choose between ‘feminism’ 
and ‘nationalism’3. Given the way that many Western feminists construct 
the Arab/Muslim ‘home’ as always and similarly oppressive to women, 
the recording with different generations of Palestinian refugee women 
would have the value of historicizing the ‘home’ and gender relations 
within it, and highlighting change (or resistance to change) in response 
to Israeli occupation policies. What follows is an attempt to re-set this 
germ of a research idea into a broader political and methodological 
framework. 
Refugees make up around 70 % of the Palestinian population world-
wide, of whom an overall 30% inhabit camps in which material 
conditions have improved little, if at all, over the ﬁfty eight years since
their establishment.4  By now a fourth generation is being born into a 
life situation characterised by poor habitat, a degraded environment, 
and the stigma of abnormality. That women bear a heavier share of the 
hardships inherent in camp life is conﬁrmed by numerous studies.5 We 
could expect that the historical experience of the camp refugee sector 
would be a central element in Palestinian history-writing. Yet this is not 
so. Palestinian class structure and culture is such that non-elite voices 
are not readily written into the national record. Historical context also 
shapes the way the ‘refugee issue’ is played out in internal Palestinian 
politics, with speciﬁc groups raising or suppressing it at particular
times for particular political purposes. Though the period since the 
Oslo Accords has seen a stronger afﬁrmation of the refugee issue, for
example by the Right of Return movement, this has not so far been 
expressed in a cultural interest in the refugee experience on the part 
 3 See Hatem 2005.
 4 Only registered refugees living in areas served by UNRWA are included here. The percentage of 
refugees living in camps varies between host countries. It is at its highest in Lebanon (53%).
5 See Sayigh and Peteet 1986; Peteet 1991; Rosenfeld 2004.
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of national institutions.6 Or to put it more accurately, for most currents 
of the national movement,  the refugees of the camps have remained 
a mute symbol of injustice rather than a potential force to speak and 
act on their own behalf. Indeed, as earlier with the peasant class and 
women, the mutedness of the refugees as bearers of a speciﬁc history
is an essential part of their role as national signiﬁers, and as symbols in
national discourse.  
If this process of ‘symbolization’ and ‘muting’ is true of the refugee 
sector in general, it is even truer of women refugees, where class and 
gender combine to silence women, and exclude their voices from the 
historical record. Rema Hammami’s examination of the commemoration 
of the 50th year after the Nakba indicate the extent to which women and 
refugees are conventionally overlooked in records of national history 
(Hammami 2005). In “a veritable deluge” of testimonials published 
in Al-Ayyam, a Palestianian daily newspaper published in Ramallah, 
over more than a year, only seven were by women; and women were 
entirely missing from the list of intellectuals invited by Al-Ayyam to 
give political analyses of the Nakba.7 Hamammi also notes that few 
interviews were recorded with men of rural origin, and there seems to 
have been no systematic attempt to ‘cover’ the camp refugee sector. This 
means that refugee spokeswomen must emerge and insist on recording 
their collective experience. If they leave others to speak for them, an 
experience with explanatory power for understanding the physical and 
cultural survival of the Palestinian people will be lost.
Why is it important for refugee women to take their own part in the 
recording Palestinian history? From many possible reasons, I will 
select three that have theoretical and political implications: i) the few 
6 There are some NGO exceptions such as Shaml, PACE and BADIL. Adel Yahya at PACE has published 
an oral history of Jalazone camp and plans to do the same for other camps. Individual researchers like 
Barbara Brill and Ghada Ageel in Gaza, and Stephanie Latte Abdallah in Jordan, have also been 
recording with refugee women: see Journal of Palestine Studies 2006; Abdallah 2006.
7 Though a few prominent women intellectuals published their Nakba recollections, they did so 
independently. Hammami notes that the women chosen by Al Ayyam to testify appeared to represent 
speciﬁc places, such as Jaffa and Deir Yassin, rather than refugee or women’s experiences of the Nakba.
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recordings that have been done with women refugees suggest that they 
were the main sustainers of families and 'homes’ in the years between 
expulsion and the establishment of UNRWA, when national institutions 
were shattered and refugee destitution was at its harshest;8 ii) refugee 
women are sharp observers of the level where oppression and national 
movement politics impinge upon local communities and families, an 
interactive ﬁeld that the notion of separation between the political and the
domestic obscures; iii) if refugee women do not actively intervene, they 
will be left out of the record, or only included if they were ‘outstanding’, 
for example as militants. Such selectivity deprives us and them of the 
recorded experiences of ‘ordinary’ women.
My experience of recording with women and men about displacement 
(tahjir) points to women’s greater capacity to observe and articulate 
the multiple effects of the Nakba. Whereas men tended to offer a 
conventional political analysis of its causes, referring to ‘plots’ and 
Arab betrayal, women described separation from family; the effects 
of loss of ‘home’; the absence of men; the hardships of movement 
across national borders; the struggle to bring up children in poverty. 
How did they manage to carry this burden, through what resources and 
stratagems? And how did their work -- in its broadest sense -- contribute 
to the re-emergence of representative Palestinian institutions, the PLO 
and Resistance movement?  We know how national histories leave out 
the 'domestic domain' as uninteresting and unimportant, because most 
historians do not know how to deal with it, and because they take its role 
in social reproduction for granted. The ideology of separation between 
the political and the social, with the political as essentially the domain 
of men and the social that of women, is part of most nationalisms; and 
Palestinian nationalism is no exception (Layyoun 1992; Massad 1995; 
Jad 2004). The idea of the ‘political’ as a kind of men’s club, into which 
only a few exceptional women are allowed, needs to be subverted. One 
avenue is certainly for women to enter political and professional life, 
8 There are still very few studies of the early period after the Nakba. As exception see Maghaames, 
Khalidi and Nasser 2005, which focuses on women’s role in sustaining expelled families.
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but there are class structural reasons why this is not a complete answer. 
Another way is to change understandings of and attitudes towards the 
domestic domain, the ‘home’, through historicizing it. 
The issue of the democratization of Palestinian society through wider 
class and sectoral representation is further justiﬁcation for the recording
of refugee women’s voices. I would argue that the General Union of 
Palestinian Women has historically viewed women of the camps as a 
‘mass’ to be mobilized rather than as potential agents to be incorporated 
into all levels of the apparatus of the Union; and that if some have risen to 
prominence this is the exception rather than the rule. Few would dispute 
that the GUPW , like all other PLO institutions, implements policies of 
the national political leadership  to its members rather than representing 
its members to the national movement leadership. Subordinated through 
class and through gender, women of the camps would have a stronger 
voice within the GUPW and the national political arena if they were 
to link themselves autonomously across UNRWA ﬁelds to identify and
articulate common concerns. What form such linking should eventually 
take is not within the scope of this proposal. I limit it to the suggestion 
that the democratization of Palestinian society would be advanced by 
the formation of a ‘lobby’ to represent camp refugee women; and that if 
an offshoot of a research project to record refugee women’s experience 
is to strengthen communication between women in different camps and 
regions, this would be politically legitimate and socially progressive.   
Studies of the camps until now have focused predominantly on the 
transmission of national history and -- where gender is a concern -- 
with women’s participation in the national movement. Little attention 
has been given to the reproduction of domestic culture or the ‘domestic 
domain’ (Latif 2004). Yet scholars acknowledge that camp homes and 
communities have historically formed a basis of Palestinian resistance 
and identity transmission. This awkward hiatus between the attribution 
of nationalism to camp homes and the absence of understanding of 
how this nationalism has been produced, what part in its production 
women have undertaken, and how reproduction of individual families 
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is articulated to (or disarticulated from) the national movement, could 
be partially ﬁlled by women’s stories of home. The transmission of a
Palestinian identity is not the only point of interest here; the creation of 
new ‘home’ communities in exile, the connections between individual 
families and camps, the symbolic and agential roles of women in 
sustaining connections, as well as change in these roles over time, form 
a ﬁeld of women’s social activity that could be better understood by
stories about ‘home’. Like housewives in Bourj Hammoud (Lebanon) 
interviewed by Joseph, Palestinian refugee women are involved in social 
networking that reproduces local camp communities as well as ties of 
kinship, friendship, and political patronage.9 This work of connection 
that women undertake as customary part of their ‘housewife’ role -- but 
which extends outside the home – carries with it a speciﬁcally refugee
form of national culture and identity that is little understood. 
In national discourse, camps are simultaneously celebrated as areas 
of ‘Palestinianism’ and mourned as milieux of deprivation and targets 
of Israeli attack. This has been particularly the case since Israel’s re-
occupation of the West Bank and attacks on Gaza, a period marked by 
heightened destruction of homes and arrest campaigns within camps. But 
in addition to the obvious insecurity of homes in camps, we need to notice 
the role of habitat as a stigma that marks out camp refugees as ‘abnormal’, 
visible and concrete evidence of their inhabitants as ‘out of place and out 
of time’ (Zetter 1991). Recordings I have done with refugees in Lebanon 
bring up complex feelings about  camps as ‘not home’/’home’, feelings of 
both aversion and attachment. Camps have been experienced at different 
times as prisons, garbage dumps, a substitute for Palestine, a home while 
waiting for the real home, and as metonym for an optionless future. Here 
again, women with their gender-speciﬁc roles in the reproduction of
family and community, can speak to us and to each other of their sense of 
these contradictions, and from what resources they create homes where a 
home in its customary sense cannot exist.
 9 Suad Joseph, in her study of women’s visiting patterns in a low-income and ethnically ‘mixed’ Beirut 
neighbourhood, just before the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, discovered that women’s visiting 
crossed sectarian and ethnic boundaries as much as they reinforced ties of kinship and sect (Joseph:1983).
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In recordings carried out in camps in Lebanon and the West Bank, I have 
found that ‘home’ is a theme that evokes many other related topics -- 
parents, siblings, relations with neighbours, the scattering of kin networks 
over space, Israeli attacks and arrests, the effects on family relations of 
poor habitat and space constraints, the effects of unemployment and work 
migration, among others. Within survey methodologies, the absence of 
comparable data across a research sample would be a problem, as the 
absence of  historical ‘facts’ in autonomous narratives would be for 
some oral historians. But the tradition of testimonial literature welcomes 
the diversity of data obtained through free association aroused by a 
single term such as ‘home’. Annelies Moors uses the term ‘topical life 
history’ for a method that combines interest in a particular topic or theme 
(such as ‘home’) with an interest in the life story as nexus between the 
individual and the various collectivities of which she/he forms a part 
(Moors 1995: 8).
Points for debate: 
problematic aspects of ‘home’ and ‘history’
While evoking ‘home’ as theme for women’s stories may be justiﬁed
because of the way it ‘works’ to generate diverse memories, one could 
object to its use on the grounds of conservativism, in that it seems to take 
for granted, and therefore implicitly strengthens, the quasi-identiﬁcation
of ‘woman’ with ‘home’ that is present in Palestinian popular culture 
as well as in orientalist writing about Arab women. In a period when 
Palestinian women can point with pride to their growing presence in 
the ‘public domain’, whether through militancy, institution-building, or 
intellectual and cultural work, is it retrograde to reiterate the framework 
of ‘home’, even if we thereby illuminate the national, cultural and social 
value of what women do there? Would use of the term ‘home’ in a study 
in the camps reinforce the gender imbalance in the division of domestic 
labour, with women who want to work outside the home still held 
responsible for house- and child-care? Even if we discovered that the 
term ‘housewife’ embraces a wide range of ‘public’ activities, would this 
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contribute towards change in gender ideology, or merely consolidate it 
by giving an argument to conservative forces who want to keep women 
out of politics?  
A related question arises in relation to ‘history’: this research proposal 
assumes that women’s stories of homes – past and present -- would have 
value as part of Palestinian national, refugee and women’s histories. 
What are the roots of such an assumption? The Zionist drive to deny 
and erase Palestinian history has generated a nationalist counter-drive 
to assert, research, record, and display this history, in texts, photos, 
journals, exhibitions and museums. In spite of initial resistances, 
national research centers and NGOs are increasingly using oral history 
to ﬁll out the gaps, and have established networks to link researchers and
data bases, introduce digitalization, attempt to standardize and generally 
improve practices of collection. Yet the assumption of the value of 
‘history-in-itself’ as part of national struggle needs to be examined, 
especially when carried out among people living in a permanent state of 
poverty and insecurity. Is a preoccupation with national history truly in 
touch with the situation and concerns of the research population, or is it 
suppressing other, more urgent needs and concerns? Diana Allan raises 
such questions in a paper about researching memories of the Nakba 
in Shateela camp (Lebanon). Does the nationalist concern for history 
and the past ignore the refugee needs for hope  and “a sense of dignity, 
self-respect and individual possibility”? Do requests for stories of the 
past “put the burden of remembrance on those with the last resources to 
realize it…[and] conceal the fact that this longing for nation may now be 
coming more from elite echelons of the Palestinian diaspora, than from 
the base”? (Allan 2005). Feminist scholars should, more than others, 
work against the ‘subject’/’object’ division embedded in research. 
These are serious questions that any nationalistically-oriented project 
must confront. As oral history becomes increasingly popular, there 
are reports that speakers are being over-exposed to requests to speak. 
Research in camps brings into relief two awkward hiatuses: between 
the different positionalities of researcher and researched; and – more 
seriously – between the aims of research and the frozen situation of 
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camp people. They are warning signs that camp dwellers see research 
as impotent to bring about any change in their situation. People may 
express this feeling openly, as Um Nazem did when she  responded to 
my request for her life story by saying: “A long and wide life we have 
spent in telling our reality and we gained nothing from it” (Um Nazem 
March 18, 1992). Colleagues report similar reactions from refugees in the 
West Bank, leading either to a refusal to speak, or to routine recitations. 
Only participation of the research community in planning and execution 
could alter this mood, by investing research with local as well as national 
value, and offering an opportunity for self-direction. The establishment 
of a network between refugee women across the diaspora might ﬁgure
as core element to ‘subjectivize’ the project from the perspective of 
potential speakers. 
Justiﬁcations
In answer to criticism of an inherent domestication of women implicated 
in words like ‘home’ (or ‘beit’ or ‘dar’), feminists could respond that 
part of their struggle is to expand the meaning of ‘home’ so that its 
restrictive, conservative associations are  subverted. Women’s narratives 
around ‘homes’ would illuminate women’s activism in sustaining homes 
in the face of colonialist aggression; show how other levels of ‘home’ 
– the nation and local community – are sustained by women’s work; 
and subvert the boundaries between the domestic and the political. 
Their testimonials would build concrete knowledge of the articulations 
between these different societal levels, and offer tools to campaigns for 
wider recognition of and status for ‘ordinary’ women.  By expanding 
the idea of ‘home’ from its minimal conception as concrete individual 
household to an imaginary space of community- and nation-building, its 
restrictiveness vis-à-vis women would lose ideological power. National 
discourse in Lebanon in the 1970s praised women as ‘mothers of a new 
generation’ and as ‘military wombs’, dangerous metaphors that highlight 
biological reproduction; their use points to the fascist tendencies inherent 
in nationalisms that do not purge themselves of patriarchy. Reduction 
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of the ‘home’ to a space of sexuality and child-production is part of 
an ideological apparatus that constrains and subordinates women. One 
strategy of counteraction is to expand notions of the home to embrace 
its role in the production of identities, localities, social relations, 
cultures, and ultimately the nation in all its diversity. The remoteness of 
a national homeland where normality can be realised remains painful for 
all Palestinians. Refugee homes are full of the memorabilia of missing 
members – dead, in prison, in the best cases studying or working abroad. 
How will all these situational features be expressed in women's stories 
of homes, and of themselves within the home?
While the nationalist assumption that the recovery of history is equally 
important to all sectors of the Palestinian people needs to be critically 
examined, we should not ignore evidence that for many women recording 
their experiences in national or social movements has been positive. 
Among the women whose life stories I recorded in Shateela camp (1989-
1991) there were some who participated enthusiastically, even though 
I was a single researcher without any national organizational backing. 
In another context, an encouraging example is Telangana women’s life 
stories recorded by the Stree Shakti Sanghatana collective in Hyderabad 
(India); through these recordings, women members reviewed their 
gendered experience in a Marxist revolutionary movement (Stree 
Shakti Sanghatani 1989). Another model is the book produced when 
Margaret Randall cooperated with the Nicaraguan Women’s Association 
(AMPRONAC) to record testimonials for Sandino’s Daughters, a vivid 
oral and visual record of Nicaraguan women’s role in the struggle against 
Somoza (Randall 1981). As Arab American women struggle to establish 
their own space in which to theorize, recount their experiences of 
silencing or misrecognition, defend their ‘homelands’ and communities, 
they break the mould of an ‘international feminism’ dominated by white 
women, and establish new circuits of identiﬁcation and exchange with
‘women of colour’, and ‘women of the South’.10 One of the theoretical 
points at issue between ‘ﬁrst wave’ (white) feminists and later (mainly
10 See the special issue on ‘Gender, Nation and Belonging’, MIT-EJMES Volume, 5, Spring 2005.
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black American) feminists critics11 has been precisly around meanings 
of ‘home’ for women, and the validity of the ‘public/domestic’ 
dichotomy.12 ‘Home’ has been re-viewed by these scholars as abase of 
resistance to racist, national, ethnic and class repression. This does not 
mean that women are not oppressed within resistance, but it does entail a 
closer, more ‘subjectivized’ regard for the interplay between oppression, 
ideology, women’s actions, and time.13 
A growing literature suggests that recorded histories of women are 
forming part of a circuit of Southern feminisms that is de-centering and 
complexifying feminist theory. Palestinian refugee women’s stories 
would contribute to this counter-hegemonic literature as much as to 
national history. Whatever aims individual participants might have 
for speaking – whether exchanging experiences with other Palestinian 
women, or telling the world about the Palestinian cause, or leaving a 
record for children and grandchildren, or fulﬁlling the political and
cultural obligation of bearing witness – should be incorporated into the 
research as rationale. 
Methodology
Participation of the research collectivity in aims, design and ultimate 
uses of a research project is important when the collectivity in question 
is a marginal one, because it offers some guarantee of relevance to 
those who participate. Some of the pitfalls associated with testimonial 
literature could also be avoided, for example pressures induced by class 
or cultural asymmetry; linguistic misunderstandings; misinterpretation 
due to distance from the research milieu. Another problem with ‘raw’ 
oral data is that it lends itself to being ‘lifted’ and placed in a context 
11 These feminists speak from a variety of racial, ethnic, or national positions, whether ‘black’, ‘women 
of colour’, ‘Third World’, ‘Latina’, etc.  
12 See Johnson-Odim 1991; Bhattacharjee 1997; Shami 2000.
13 Latte Abdallah emphasizes generational difference in contestation of family among Palestinian 
refugee women in camps in Jordan (Abdallah 2006).
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that changes its meaning, often deforming it. This becomes less of a 
hazard when research strategy ‘plants’ a research idea in a speciﬁc social
milieu or category, in this case, camp refugee women, with the aim of 
initiating a project combining research with networking and institution-
building. Such an aim is no longer restricted to acquiring data, as in 
survey research, nor of publishing a book, as in testimonial research, but 
enters a new territory of open-ended, participatory action-research with 
diverse potential end products.
A participant research strategy precludes laying down in detail exactly 
what methods will be used. There has to be a proposal or plan, to 
avoid an appearance of chaos, and of losing too much time over initial 
discussions. But the initiators also have to show readiness to change the 
plan in response to arguments emerging from the research collectivity. A 
ﬁrst step would have to be to search for active women’s groups in camps
with whom to cooperate. A choice would have to be made between a 
centralised project, with all camp women’s groups adopting similar 
aims and methods; or for each set of camp participants to choose their 
own aims and methods. Since the building of a cross-borders refugee 
women’s network is one of the side-aims of this project, the initiators 
would need to have a clear policy towards issues of freedom and control. 
It would also be important to avoid any one faction gaining control of 
the project through its active women members. The Women’s Centres 
that already exist in camps in Gaza and the West Bank might be the 
readiest available partners. In other ﬁelds, the initiators might cooperate
with the GUPW on an explicit basis of independence. NGOs based in 
the camps are another potential source of partnership. 
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Proﬁle of Single Women in Palestine
Hanan Halabi
Dr. Hanan Halabi, a faculty member at Birzeit 
University’s Institute of Community and Public 
Health, contributed this statistical proﬁle of
unmarried Palestinian women to the Institute 
of Women’s Studies research project on this 
neglected topic (see also Johnson in this volume). 
Analyzing data from three demographic and 
health surveys conducted by the Palestine Central 
Bureau of Statistics in 1996, 2000 and 2004 (as 
well as other sources), Halabi identiﬁes gaps in
the universality of marriage between Palestinian 
women and men in the West Bank and Gaza, 
with about one out of ten women aged 35-44 not 
married compared to an almost universal pattern 
of marriage among men in the same age group. 
Halabi also draws our attention to some of the 
characteristics of never-married women in their 
diverse circumstances, ﬁnding unmarried women,
for example, clustered at the two poles of education 
– both the least and the most educated – and with 
higher labor market participation than their married 
counterparts.   Halabi also constructed a standard 
of living index, which ﬁnds unmarried women at a
disadvantage.    She also raises signiﬁcant questions
for further investigation, whether on changing 
marriage patterns or assessing the health and well-
being of single women in different settings.
Introduction
To varying degrees and at different paces over the past three to four 
decades, countries of the Arab region have been experiencing a trend of 
delayed ﬁrst marriages as well as an increase in non-marriage for women
(i.e. a decrease in the universality of marriage) (DeJong and El-Khoury 
2006).  Based on data on the timing and universality of marriages, Osman 
and Rashad placed Arab countries at three different stages of transition in 
nuptuality patterns (2003).  For example, Egypt, Yemen, and Oman were 
placed in the ﬁrst stage of early and universal marriages, while Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Tunisia were classiﬁed as having marriages
that are delayed but universal.  In the third stage, which is that of delayed 
and non-universal marriages, were countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Kuwait.  It has been noted that the Palestinian situation appears to be a 
rather unique one, characterized by early yet relatively non-universal 
marriages (Rashad, Osman and Roudi-Fahimi 2005).
Osman and Rashad also noted that the clustering of different countries 
within each stage could not be clearly explained by female literacy 
levels alone or even by similarities in culture and social structures 
(2003).  They proposed that other factors must be involved in the 
changes in nuptuality patterns and that “ the nature of these forces and 
their effect are not necessarily similar across all Arab societies (p.26).” 
This certainly raises the question of the magnitude and nature of the 
effect of conﬂict (whether the major wars or the more recent popular
uprisings) in shaping the Palestinian marriage patterns over time.  The 
effect of the ﬁrst Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) on lowering the age at
marriage has been studied previously (Khawaja 2000), and it is certain 
that the current situation in Palestine, characterized by sustained conﬂict
and by the erection of the Separation Wall, will have farther-reaching 
social implications.
This paper examines the changes and consistencies in marriage patterns 
of Palestinian women and takes a closer look at the proﬁle of never-
married women, a particularly interesting group given societal emphasis 
on marriage and the signiﬁcance of the role of motherhood in the lives
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of Arab and Palestinian women.  It is important to clarify that the 
focus of this proﬁle is not on the reasons why women marry or rather
do not marry (although the data on the availability of men provide 
some hints in that direction).  Instead, the focus is on what nationally 
representative Palestinian surveys inform us about the characteristics 
of a previously neglected category in Palestinian society, namely never-
married women.
Methodology
The proﬁle is based primarily on data from the Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) 2004, the Health Survey 2000, and the Health Survey 1996 
conducted by the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and it 
draws on other published tables and reports from PCBS, including data 
from the 1997 national population Census.  The DHS target population is 
all Palestinian households residing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(OPT), with a focus on ever-married women aged 1554- years and on 
children under 5 years old.  Demographic and health surveys focus on 
maternal and child health indicators and cover women’s reproductive 
history, pregnancy and breastfeeding, family planning, fertility preferences, 
tetanus toxoid coverage, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, and child immunization 
practices.   In addition, data are also collected on the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of households in the sample, with a 
detailed roster of household members.  A stratiﬁed two-stage random
sampling design is used, and the response rates are generally very high. 
In the 2000 and 2004 surveys for example, 5729 and 4972 eligible women 
were interviewed at 99% and 98% response rates, respectively.  The 
survey instruments, target population, sampling strategy, and ﬁeldwork
methodology are standardized, allowing for comparisons survey indicators 
over time.  Details of the methodology and data collection instruments are 
published by PCBS (PCBS 2001 and PCBS 2006).
Analyses of the characteristics of never-married women were based 
on data from the Household Members Data section of the Household 
Questionnaire.  This section contains information on every member 
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of the household, as reported by the survey respondent (usually, the 
female head of household).  In addition to questions on each household 
member’s age, sex, and marital status, there are also questions on his/her 
relation to head of household, refugee and returnee status, presence of 
chronic diseases and/or disabilities, educational level and attainment, 
relation to labor force, health insurance coverage, and smoking status.    
In order to describe the standard of living of never-married women, a 
weighted standard of living index was constructed using factor analysis 
including twelve variables from the Demographic and Health Survey 
2004.  Those variables, which represented selected household amenities 
in addition to the crowding ratio, where obtained from the Dwelling and 
Household Data section of the Household Questionnaire.    
The response rates to the three surveys are very high (>90%), and the 
data are considered of good quality, due to standardized training of 
ﬁeldworkers and to other quality control measures in data collection
and management.  For some variables, there were slight differences, 
especially in the response categories, over the three surveys.  Whenever 
necessary, response categories were recoded to ensure comparability 
of the variables over the years.  For our purposes, there was greater 
comparability between the variables of the 2000 and 2004 surveys than 
with the 1996 survey.  
A note must be made of the limitations of the data on single women 
in Palestine and perhaps elsewhere as well.  There has only been one 
Census in 1997, which provides detailed district-speciﬁc data; the next
census is scheduled for implementation in 2007.  Thus, the possibility 
of looking into certain variables at the district level, and within district, 
at the level of locality type (urban/rural/camp), is quite limited due 
to the relatively small numbers of unmarried women.  Demographic 
and Health surveys, though conducted regularly every four years, are 
primarily geared towards ever-married women and their children, and 
particularly married women of child-bearing age as the main topics of 
the survey are reproductive and child health.  As such, there are not 
many issues included in those surveys that relate speciﬁcally to the
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lives of single women.  However, it must be noted that the DHS 2004 
contained for the ﬁrst time, a section on health (self-rated health, health
care seeking behaviors, and health behaviors) that included all women 
regardless of their marital status or age.   This section was used in the 
analysis below. 
Finally, the statistical presentation is divided into three sections.  The 
ﬁrst section examines the patterns of marriage (and non-marriage) in
Palestine over the years, and in some cases by region as well.  In the 
second section, the education levels, employment status, and standard 
of living of never-married women are compared with those of their 
currently married counterparts, and in the ﬁnal section, we will make use
of the section in DHS 2004 which looks at the reported health behaviors 
and care seeking behaviors of all women, to see if there are any distinct 
features in the group of never-married women.
Section 1: Patterns of Marriage
In terms of timing, marriage in Palestine occurs at an early age relative 
to most Arab countries, although in several high-fertility Arab countries, 
such as Yemen and Mauritania, age at marriage remains quite low 
(Chkeir 2004).  According to the Demographic and Health Survey 2004, 
13.5% of Palestinian females aged 15 - 19 years were already married, 
compared to 6% in Jordan (2002), 10% in Egypt (2003), and 17% in 
Yemen (2003).
However, a look at the data from the three surveys shows that the 
proportion married at the young age groups (15 - 19 years) has been 
declining in Palestine, indicating some decline in early marriage 
(Table 1).  In fact, in 2004 the median age at marriage for females rose 
to 19.0 years for both the West Bank and Gaza from 18.0 years in 1997 
(PCBS 2006).  It will be interesting to see if the 2007 census, with its 
inclusive data collection, conﬁrms this trend.
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Table 1.  Proportion of ever-married women 
by selected 5-year age-groups and year of survey *
1996 2000 2004
15 - 19 24.0 17.8 13.5
20 - 24 63.9 59.0 59.0
25 - 29 79.9 79.8 78.4
* Source of Data: Palestinian DHS Surveys for those years; ﬁgures for 1996 are 
based on published tables from PCBS; ﬁgures from 2000 and 2004 are based on
calculations from the raw data
Breaking down these ﬁgures by region, it is apparent that the decline in the
proportions married at the younger ages is more dramatic in the Gaza Strip 
compared to the West Bank, especially between the 1996 and 2000 surveys. 
However, on the whole, the marriage pattern in Gaza is characterized by 
earlier and more universal marriages compared to the West Bank.
Table 2.  Proportion of ever-married women
 by selected 5-year age groups, year of survey, and region
1996 2000 2004
WB GS WB GS WB GS
15 - 19 21.1 30.2 17.7 18.0 12.5 15.0
20 - 24 60.0 72.4 58.3 60.2 55.9 64.2
25 - 29 77.0 85.8 77.6 84.3 76.2 82.1
Thus in summary, although marriage in Palestine remains early relative 
to several Arab countries, it is becoming more delayed over time.  The 
changes in Gaza appear to be more dramatic than in the West Bank.
In addition to timing, universality is an important aspect of describing 
marriage patterns in a population.  Universality refers to the overall 
proportion of women who marry.  According to the surveys, approximately 
two-thirds of Palestinian women in the reproductive age have ever-
married (66.2% in 1996, 64.5% in 2000 and 63.6% in 2004).  
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A useful way of looking at the universality of marriage in a population 
is to look at the proportions never married in the older age groups (such 
as late thirties or early forties).  At these ages, singlehood is likely to be 
permanent, as there is little chance that a woman in most Arab societies 
will experience a ﬁrst marriage thereafter.
Table 3.  Proportion of never- married women by selected 5-year age groups and 
year of survey (permanent singlehood)*
1996* 2000 2004
30 - 34 16.7 12.7 13.2
35 - 39 12.1 12.6 11.9
40 - 44 9.2 9.8 9.3
* ﬁgures for 1996 are based on published tables from PCBS; ﬁgures from 2000 and 
2004 are based on calculations from the raw data 
In terms of regional differences, the proportion of never-married women 
in their thirties and early forties is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza. 
The large difference observed in the 40-44 years age group may be due, 
at least in part, to the small number of women available in that age group 
in the sample. 
Table 4.  Proportion of never- married women by selected 5-year age groups, 
region and year of survey (permanent singlehood)*
2000 2004
WB GS WB GS
30 - 34 14.8 8.5 16.1 9.3
35 - 39 16.1 8.5 13.2 8.7
40 - 44 12.3 6.4 11.7 3.5
* ﬁgures for 1996 are based on published tables from PCBS; ﬁgures from 2000 and 
2004 are based on calculations from the raw data 
Thus, approximately one out of 10 women in their early forties has never 
married.  These ﬁgures are much higher than Arab countries that share
with Palestine the phenomenon of early marriage, such as Egypt, Yemen 
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and Oman, and they are more comparable with countries with delayed 
ﬁrst marriages, such as Jordan and Kuwait (Rashad, Osman and Roudi-
Fahimi 2005).  
In summary, marriage in Palestine is less universal compared to that 
of many Arab countries, but there have not been dramatic changes in 
universality over the years of the survey.  It should be noted however, 
that the time interval between the surveys is not very long.
Variations in Marriage Patterns
There appear to be variations in marriage patterns by region, district, 
and by religion.  Marriage in Gaza is both earlier and more universal 
than marriage in the West Bank.  However, within the West Bank, the 
northern districts appear to have higher proportions of unmarried women 
in their late thirties (i.e. permanently single).  It should be noted that, due 
to the small number of never-married women in the those age groups 
in the samples of the health surveys, district-level ﬁgures would not be
meaningful.  Therefore, Census data were used to compare variations in 
marriage patterns by district.  It will be very interesting to what, if any, 
changes appear in the upcoming 2007 Census, especially as the data 
may reﬂect the possible effect of closures and mobility restrictions on
marriage markets.
 In the northern district of Jenin, approximately one ﬁfth of women had
not married by the end of their thirties, according to data from the 1997 
Census.  The proximity of these districts to Israel and the possibility of 
marrying Palestinian women from inside the green line might be one 
explanation for the levels of singlehood there.  Along the same lines, 
it has been suggested that the relatively high proportions of singlehood 
among Palestinian women could be due to marriages of Palestinian men 
to Jordanian women and bringing them to settle in the West Bank, thus 
competing with Palestinian women from the West Bank for the pool of 
eligible men (Rashad, Osman and Roudi Fahimi, 2005).   Following the 
north, the central districts of Ramallah and Jerusalem have the highest 
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levels of permanent singlehood.  Ramallah is known to be a commercial 
and social hub for the West Bank, and it is less traditional and less 
conservative than the northern or southern districts.   It also has a higher 
proportion of Christians than other districts in the West Bank.  In the 
case of Jerusalem, the restrictions and complexities of issuing residence 
permits to non-Jerusalemites who marry Jerusalemites may be a factor 
in shaping and limiting the marriage market.
Table 5. Proportions never married by district
% Never-married 30-34 % Never-married 35-39
Ramallah 21.2 15.7
Jerusalem 21.2 13.0
Bethlehem 14.7 8.0
Hebron 10.3 8.0
Jenin 24.7 21.1
Tulkarem/Qalqiliya 20.1 16.7
Nablus 22.2 15.0
North Gaza 11.4 8.7
South and Central Gaza 11.9 8.8
Source:  PCBS Marital Characteristics in the Palestinian Territory, Table 2. (May 
2000) using 1997 Census data.
In addition to the variation by district, there is also a variation in the 
distribution of unmarried women by religion.  Only the 1997 Census has 
information on religion, and the data indicate a higher level of singlehood 
among Christian women compared to their Muslim counterparts at every 
age group.  The gap between Christian and Muslim women is largest in 
the birth cohorts of the thirties and forties.  In the 60-64 age group, 
almost one in ﬁve Christian women never married compared to only 4%
of Muslim women of the same age.  This age group would have been at 
a marriageable age around and after the 1948 war.  The effect of conﬂict
on marriage has been noted before in the Palestinian context.  Khawaja 
(2000) noted than the age of marriage among Palestinian women fell 
during the ﬁrst Uprising (Intifada).  However, in the case of the 1948
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war, out-migration to the West, especially among Christians, might have 
skewed marriage patterns towards non-marriage. 
Table 6. Never-married women by age group and religion
% Never-married 
Muslim
% Never-married 
Christian
25 - 29 16.6 27.3
30 - 34 12.9 19.0
35 - 39 10.5 16.1
40 - 44 8.3 15.1
45 - 49 8.2 16.7
50 - 54 7.2 19.3
55 - 59 5.3 19.3
60 - 64 3.9 20.5
Source: PSBC Marital Characteristics in the Palestinian Territory, Table 2. (May 
2000) using 1997 census data.
Finally, in the DHS 2004, there were no statistically signiﬁcant differences
in the proportion of single women in their thirties and early forties by 
type of locality (rural/urban/camp), although the small numbers should 
be viewed with caution
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A Look at the Men
Although the primary purpose of this paper is not to investigate the 
reasons for singlehood, it is still useful to examine the pattern of marriage 
among men.  
Figure 1: Percentage Distribution of Never-married persons in 
Palestine aged 15-49 by age and sex
  Males
  Females
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15 - 19     20 - 24     25 - 29     30 - 34     35 -39     40 - 44     45 - 49 
             Source: PCBS Youth Survey 2004 (2003 data)
After age 30 years, there are more unmarried females than males, 
and the gap increases with age. By age 45-49 years, there are 
almost no males that have never-married. This could be due to a 
number of reasons, including the spousal age-gap, out-migration 
of males, and the possibility of cross-border marriages described 
earlier. The patterns is consistent in both regions, although the gap 
in singlehood levels at the older age groups is larger in the West 
Bank than in Gaza.
Similar ﬁndings on the dearth of never-married men in the older ages
were also reported from the 1995 Demographic Survey of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip (Stokke 2001).
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Table 7: Percentage Distribution of Never-married persons 
aged 15-49 by sex and region
% Never-Married
West Bank Gaza Strip
Males Females Males Females
15 - 19 99.0 86.6 99.2 84.8
20 - 24 85.2 46.8 77.4 41.9
25 - 29 43.1 19.2 33.8 17.1
30 - 34 12.1 12.5 7.3 9.9
35 - 39 4.2 13.5 0.7 6.9
40 - 44 1.7 14.7 0.9 7.3
45 - 49 0.7 11.2 1.9 4.3
Source: PCBS Youth Survey 2004 (2003 data)
Section II: Proﬁle of Single Women (30+)
In this section, never-married women are compared with currently 
married women rather than with ever-married women. The distinction 
may not be very signiﬁcant in terms of its statistical implications, but
the rationale is that divorced and widowed women (who with currently 
married women constitute the group of ever-married women) are a 
vulnerable group unto themselves in Palestinian society.
Never-married women are concentrated at the poles of education 
(primary or less or above secondary) compared to their married 
counterparts.  According to the DHS 2004, almost one half (48.9%) 
of never-married women over 30 years of age have primary education 
or lower, and 22.9% have above secondary education.  In contrast, 
only 10.7% of married women of the same age have above secondary 
education.  
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Table 8.  Education in never-married vs. 
currently married women 30 years and over
Never-married % 
(N)
Currently married 
% (N)
30 - 34*
Primary or lower 38.0 (49) 30.7 (254)
Above Secondary 27.9 (36) 14.4 (119)
35 - 39
Primary or lower 42.0 (42) 35.9 (253)
Above Secondary 21.0 (21) 14.0 (99)
40 - 44*
Primary or lower 52.9 (37) 45.4 (295)
Above Secondary 21.4 (15) 11.8 (77)
45 - 49*
Primary or lower 48.8 (20) 54.8 (227)
Above Secondary 31.7 (13) 9.7 (40)
* Statistically signiﬁcant differences; Based on DHS 2004
It is quite interesting that in the last three age groups the gap at post-
secondary widens with age, suggesting perhaps that educated women 
had more difﬁculty marrying in the past.  This ﬁts with data in Palestine
and elsewhere that shows many more contemporary marriages where 
the educational gap is in favor of women (or equal).  
Although the numbers are quite small in the DHS 2004, it is obvious that 
education and employment are related, with the level of employment 
increasing as the level of education increases. Never-married 30+ women 
are more likely to be employed or to have ever-worked compared to 
their currently married counterparts, and this is true at all levels of 
education.  
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Table 9. Education and relation to labor force in never-married and currently 
married women 30+ years
Ever-worked % (n)
Never-married Currently-married
< Secondary education 23.5 (79) 4.8 (152)
Secondary education and above 84.0 (84) 54.8 (207)
Additionally, currently married women are more likely to be unpaid family 
members than their never-married counterparts.  Both the employment 
and educational status of a signiﬁcant proportion of unmarried women
in Palestine indicate that stereotypes that single women are dependent 
or unproductive must be questioned. At the same time, the situation of 
unmarried women in difﬁcult circumstances needs to be addressed.
Table 10. Employment Status by age group and marital status (for employed and 
unemployed ever-worked Palestinian Population)
Never-Married Women Currently Married Women
% Emplo-
yer
% Self-
employed
% Wage 
employee
% Unpaid family 
member
% Emplo-
yer
% Self-
employed
% Wage 
employee
% Unpaid family 
member
15 - 19 0.45 2.2 78.3 15.4 0.71 7.9 52.9 35.0
20 - 24 0.21 2.0 93.1 3.3 0.70 3.8 85.0 9.1
25 - 44 1.1 4.1 90.5 3.2 1.9 5.7 84.8 6.8
45 - 64 2.5 12.1 79.3 4.3 2.1 11.0 71.2 15.5
65+ 5.3 21.2 51.6 6.0 4.9 30.5 21.0 40.4
Based on Census 1997; Numbers in 65+ category are very small, so the percentages 
should be viewed with caution.
Never-married women who are 30 years and older live in households 
that are slightly smaller than their married counterparts: total number 
of household members 5.3 vs.6.9 (p <0.001), and they tend to live with 
parents or siblings (DHS 2004). These living arrangements suggest a 
pattern where unmarried women have the responsibility of caring for 
elderly parents, or live with married siblings as part of their extended 
family.   A very small proportion of unmarried women live on their own.
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Almost one half of the never-married women were found to be living 
in households with the lowest standard of living, compared to a third of 
currently married women.  The differences are statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 11.  Distribution of 30+ Single vs. Married women in STL categories 
(from DHS 2004)
Never-Married % 
(N)
Currently Married 
% (N)
Lowest STL category 48.5 (118) 33.2 (1169)
Middle STL category 27.0 (118) 30.4 (1073)
Highest STL category 24.5 (107) 36.4 (1283)
In general, it was found that the level of education and employment 
status correlate well with STL index constructed here (i.e. the more 
highly educated and the employed are in the higher STL categories). 
Thus, it was expected that never-married women would be found in 
the higher STL categories. However, single women were more likely 
to be found in lower STL households than their married counterparts, 
even when looking within each level of education separately.  It should 
also be remembered that the STL index is based on household amenities 
and crowding ratio, which in turn could be more of a reﬂection on the
family’s situation than of the personal qualiﬁcations of the single woman
(i.e. her education and employment), which in fact maybe the family 
strategy to get out of poverty.
Section III: Health and healthcare-seeking behaviors in 
never-married women 30 years and over compared to their 
married counterparts.
As mentioned earlier, the 2004 DHS contained for the ﬁrst time a set of
questions on general health and health-seeking behaviors that included 
all women, and not only ever-married women.  Again, the comparisons 
made in this section are between unmarried women aged 30 years and 
older with their currently married counterparts.
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Table 12.  Health perceptions of never-married and currently married women over 
30 years
Never-Married 
% (N)
Currently- Married % 
(N)
Self-rate their overall health as 
excellent or very good 68.1 (214) 54.0 (1514)
Believe that their height and 
weight are matched 62.4 (196) 50.4 (1411)
Believe that they are a little or 
very over-weight 28.3 (89) 42.7 (1196)
Report that they are anemic* 5.7 (18) 11.6 (324)
Report having a pap smear at 
least once every 3 years 5.4 (17) 29.4 (822)
Report not conducting a self 
breast exam 82.7 (259) 66.3 (1855)
* most married and never-married women reported that they were diagnosed by a 
doctor
In terms of health perceptions, never-married women seem to have more 
positive perceptions of their own health compared to currently married 
women.  This is despite the well-known fact that health services are 
generally directed towards currently married women, especially in 
relation to reproductive events.  Never-married women have a more 
positive impression of their overall health and their body weight, and they 
are less likely to report being anemic.  Perhaps this is not surprising, in 
light of the prevalent pattern of frequent and closely spaced pregnancies; 
a pattern that is not conducive for losing the pregnancy weight or for 
rebuilding the body’s iron stores. 
 However, in terms of health-seeking behaviors, never-married women 
are at a disadvantage when it comes to important screening tests, such 
as screening for breast cancer and conducting pap smears to screen for 
cervical cancer.  The latter is entirely predictable, as it is very unlikely 
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for unmarried Palestinian women to seek care for gynecological issues, 
especially if an internal examination is involved.  In fact, the bias in health 
services provision in favor of married women has been documented in 
other Arab countries as well (DeJong and El-Khoury 2006). 
Currently married women were more likely to report having experienced 
an illness in the two weeks immediately preceding the survey (35.0% 
compared to 24.0% never-married women).  However, there were no 
signiﬁcant differences in the type of illness reported (acute somatic vs.
psychological) or in the patterns of seeking treatment for that illness.  For 
usual medical care, both groups of women reported going most frequently 
to a private physician, followed by a governmental or non-governmental 
facility.  Never-married women were more likely to report going to no 
one for care (8.0% compared to 4.5% among married women).
Never-married women are more likely not to have health insurance 
(especially in the West Bank) or to be covered by social welfare 
insurance.  Currently married women have access to governmental 
insurance through husbands that work in the public sector, 
Table 13.  Health insurance in the 30+ age group of never-married vs. currently 
married women:
Never-Married % 
(N)
Currently-Married % 
(N)
Have Governmental Health 
insurance 42.3 (185) 56.0 (1975)*
Have UNRWA insurance 27.2 (119) 31.8 (1122)
Have social welfare insurance 7.3 (32) 2.8 (99)*
Have NO insurance 30.2 (132) 20.6 (728)*
* p < 0.01; the differences between never-married and married women in having 
governmental or no insurance are in the West Bank only; the difference in the 
social welfare category exists for both regions
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Conclusion
The social and cultural centrality of the marriage institution in 
Palestinian society and in other Arab societies cannot be overstated. 
Traditionally in Palestine, marriage occurred at a young age for women, 
and for decades the age at marriage remained stable, although it is 
now showing evidence of a slight rise.  At the same time and despite 
its prevalence, marriage in Palestine is not as universal as might be 
expected, especially in comparison to other Arab countries with similar 
or even higher ages at ﬁrst marriage.  It appears from this report that
there have not been dramatic shifts in the universality of marriage in 
recent years.
This proﬁle intended to use the data from health surveys conducted
regularly over a period of eight years, as well as other published 
statistical data to take a closer look at single women, especially those 
whose singlehood appears permanent.  Such as group of never-married 
women poses a social and cultural challenge to their society.  These 
women are seen to have somehow “deviated” from what was once 
considered an inevitable role.  There is a dearth of information about 
their lives, living conditions, and characteristics.  The information we 
get from surveys suggests that there is no signiﬁcant differences in their
residence locality, but they are more likely to have secondary education 
and above and to be employed (and not working for a family member). 
However, they fare worse in the standard of living classiﬁcation based
on household amenities.  The extent of their independence and control 
over resources cannot be known from these standard surveys, but the 
issue would be a very important one to study.  Qualitative, in-depth 
studies are needed to show the social roles that these women ﬁnd, the
extent to which they are able to control their lives, and the meaning 
and experience of singlehood.  One thing is obvious, though it cannot 
be captured from the limited numbers in the surveys: single women 
are not the same, and the experience of singlehood in one location 
and for one group of women may not be the same for women in other 
locations and living in different circumstances.
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The voices of single women must be heard and their concerns and issues 
must be known, regardless of whether their numbers of proportions in 
society are increasing or not.  For example, while never-married women 
rate their health more positively than married women, we know from 
other work the extent to which health services are inaccessible to single 
women (for some services more than others and for reasons that are not 
necessarily ﬁnancial, but rather having to do with the sex of the provider,
the social acceptability of seeking certain services). So, it is important 
to see how they see their lives, and what aspects they ﬁnd fulﬁlling and
empowering.
The phenomena of delayed marriages and decreased universality in 
marriage are important demographic changes in the Arab region in recent 
times, and they are not without their social and cultural implications. 
These changes are giving rise to a group of women in their late twenties 
and thirties who are unmarried.  In a cultural context that still largely 
emphasizes marriage and motherhood, the living conditions, needs, 
and aspirations of these women warrant further closer studies of both 
quantitative and qualitative types.   
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Palestinian Single Women: 
Agency, Choice, Responsibility
Penny Johnson
This article, along with the companion piece by 
Hanan Halabi in this issue of the Review, is part of 
an IWS research project on unmarried women in 
Palestine.  Here, Johnson  focuses on the lives and 
contributions of single working women who are 
highly educated and independent, an important, 
but by no means universal, category of unmarried 
women in Palestine.  She  also presented this paper 
at the Reproductive Health Working Group, held in 
Istanbul on 9-11 July 2006.
Special thanks to Andileeb Udwan for conducting, 
transcribing and sending two important interviews 
in Gaza despite the severe conditions there in the 
summer of 2006.
When I emailed Wisam1, an  unmarried women in her forties living and 
working in Ramallah, for an interview for this project, she answered me 
with the directness that is a strong feature of her character:
The project you are working on sounds very interesting. The 
problem is that I don’t think I have much to contribute to this 
study.  I don’t see myself in those terms.  I don’t think the fact that 
I am unmarried has any signiﬁcant advantages or disadvantages
over what I chose to do privately or publicly.”
Wisam’s words serve as a warning to avoid any temptation to consider 
unmarried women in Palestine or elsewhere as a unitary category – 
and undermines the assumption that singlehood is at the center of an 
unmarried women’s identity or perception of herself.  It also implied 
to me that our  interviews should be embedded in a broader life story 
approach in order to understand the signiﬁcance or non-signiﬁcance of
being unmarried in the course of life events.
Despite Wisam’s ﬁrst reaction, she agreed to a conversation and we
sat in a Ramallah café and talked about her life.  Themes of living and 
managing alone – of an intense absorption in work and facing a series of 
very difﬁcult work challenges and decisions by herself – were prominent. 
Being unmarried thus may not be a badge of identity, as Wisam warns. 
But being an unmarried woman in Palestine  where marriage is strongly 
normative and family life often the only refuge from insecurity,  offers 
speciﬁc circumstances, challenges, constraints and even opportunities
that deserve exploring. Wisam, for example, describes one of her 
difﬁculties simply as learning to eat alone.
After graduating from Birzeit University, Wisam began work with a 
cooperative factory where women workers, rather unusually, made 
export-oriented luxury items. 
1  Names and some other identifying details  have been changed to protect privacy except in the case 
of former Minister for Women’s Affairs, Zahera Kamal and Dr. Ilham Abu Ghazaleh, both of whom 
agreed not to be anonymous.
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My job was my whole life, a dream come true, I felt I was 
making a contribution.   I was never interested in  traditional 
jobs.  I did the work lovingly, I never felt burdened. it was like 
a child playing. It wasn’t easy, many people were suspicious.  I 
fought with friends and family who thought the project couldn’t 
be justiﬁed…...  Superﬁcially, there is nothing attractive about
this work.  But I would explain and my parents supported me. 
My father was even detained and questioned.  They told him 
“Your daughter makes products  that says “Made in the Israeli-
occupied West Bank”. I was 21, 22.  It was very young to be 
ﬁghting these battles….  Looking back, I had no other choice.  I
wasn’t a person to marry, have children and be a secretary.  Or 
to have a checklist for a secure future and tick it off.  I couldn’t 
be any other way.”
Wisam’s qualities of risk and deﬁance – as well as her desire to make
a contribution and to live differently -- are present in among the other 
unmarried women I interviewed and began to intrigue me.  Also  I began 
to be aware of media discourse across the Arab world where   the growing 
number of  single women in Arab world is posed solely as a problem – or 
even a moral panic of sorts  (Ghazi 2006,  Shaikh 2006).  Headlines on 
the rise of unmarried women frame it almost as an epidemic that needs 
public intervention for the health of the society.  One headline from the 
Khaleej Times, for example  read:  “Alarm bells ring as rate of UAE 
spinsters rises”  and called for the “involvement of all segments of the 
society as well as the authorities to combat  this  “alarming rate,” given 
as an entirely improbable 73%. (Ibrahim 2004)   I thus wanted  to capture 
some of the energy and empowerment that unmarried women give to 
Palestinian society, both in the present and historically, for example the 
role unmarried women have had in building educational and charitable 
institutions.2   Media and public discourse also point to an unsettling of 
2 In 1924,  Miss Nabiha Nasser founded one of the ﬁrst  rural schools for girls in the village of Birzeit
it would later develop into Birzeit College in the 1960s and Birzeit University in the 1970s. In 
Jerusalem, Hind al Husseini founded and developed Dar El Tiﬂ. See Fleischmann 2003 for examples
of unmarried women in pre-1948 Palestinian women’s movement.
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assumptions about universal marriage and raises question about 
whether the “cognitive frame of marriage” (Friedl 2003) has 
started to shift.  Using Bourdieu’s useful terms, we could consider 
that marriage has moved from a “doxa” (unquestioned common 
sense that doesn’t need explanation or defense) to an “orthodoxy, ” 
(a truth that has been questioned and needs authority and defense). 
(Bourdieu 1979, 168 - 9)
In this paper, I will be using  in-depth interviews conducted  with  nine 
unmarried Palestinian women from 35 - 66, seven currently living in 
Ramallah (although two were raised in Nablus, one in another northern 
West Bank town, one in Jerusalem, one partly in Jerusalem and Cairo) 
and two in Gaza to explore questions of agency, choice, and responsibility. 
Three are Christians and seven Muslim.  All are or have been professional 
or semi-professional working women for much of their adult lives, and 
all  have some form of  post-secondary education, although education 
may have been disrupted and discontinuous.  With the exception of one 
woman, whose  university education and paid work was delayed until 
her forties, all had been working in the labor force for most of their 
adult life.  True to the labor patterns in Palestine for educated women, 
the women’s occupations were clustered in teaching and public sector/
government employment.  Occupational proﬁles, however, do not reﬂect
the whole story.  Ilham, now 66 and retired from teaching at Birzeit 
University, returned to Nablus after graduating from Cairo University in 
1965 and, in her words,  “refused to be a teacher which was the only job 
available.”  She held out but then worked for a year as a teacher in 1966, 
resigned in 1967 and was accepted to be a tour guide in Europe where 
she “wanted to see the world.”  Then came the June War; Ilham remained 
in Nablus.  Public sector/government employment for four women is 
strongly tied to their and their family’s links to the Palestinian resistance. 
For example,  Suha,  a returnee to Gaza in 1966 and a long-time militant, 
worked for ﬁve years with the new Palestinian police before becoming
an ofﬁcial in the General Union of Palestinian Women.  
At the time of the interview, a majority (ﬁve) lived alone, including
two of the three women under 45, although several had spent a long 
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proportion of their adult life living with an elderly mother, an unmarried 
sister or other family members.  
This group thus reﬂects the disproportionate number of unmarried women
with higher education and professional work, but I would not claim it to be 
representative.  These “modernist” characteristics, however, are of special 
interest as new social categories of unmarried women emerge in Palestine 
and the region.   On my part,  I was interested in the way these women 
grappled with power and powerlessness in different stages of their lives 
and how what can only be called “character” – sometimes deﬁant, often
unconventional, remarkably persistent and stubborn – operated in answering 
structural constraints.    Choice and agency , for example, operates directly 
in the matter of marriage in that all but one woman had multiple marriage 
proposals.  But it also operates in more subtle ways, including how women 
cast even adverse and intractable circumstances in terms of agency, choice 
and personal responsibility.  “I decided,” said Mariam from Breij refugee 
camp of her “decision” to stay home and take care of the family after 
graduating from secondary school and ﬁnding she was ineligible for further
UNRWA education because her brother was already in a training program 
“because education does not have a time limit.” 
Responsibility takes the familiar pattern of unmarried women taking on 
the  care of elderly parents, younger children and work in the home. 
For Zahera,  educating seven younger siblings after the death of her 
father involved taking on the power and responsibility of the head of 
the family, a role she decisively embraced.   Abla, living with and taking 
care of her aging mother for two decades in the absence of sibling or 
other support,  clearly articulates a complicated mixture of insecurity, 
resentment, love and the fear of loss.   However,  responsibility not only 
includes choice in this commitment to family, but takes another turn 
which is responsibility to society.  A common refrain, articulated her 
by Mariam in Gaza was: “I wanted to be someone, to serve society.” 
Choice and responsibility are thus interacting poles.
Because I am focusing  on women who speak of themselves in terms of 
choice and empowerment, whatever difﬁculties they have faced, I feel
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obliged to  give two counter-examples to remind us that no one, including 
this sample, represents single women.  In the scant  scholarly attention 
to unmarried women in Palestine, Rothenberg, in her ethnography of 
women in the West Bank village of Artas in the late 1990s interviews 
two unmarried women who blame their singlehood on possession by a 
jinn.  In a similar time period, Saar’s study of unmarried women in Israel 
ﬁnds a Christian and a Muslim woman in Haifa blaming their unmarried
state on spells cast by ill-wishers.  In both, a denial of agency offers an 
explanation for an undesirable, almost cursed, state.
And an even  more  telling  example.  An elderly woman living without 
family or any kin in a Ramallah-area village answered the question of 
a graduate student who was asking  women in the village:  What do 
women’s rights mean to you? She gave the following poignant answer: 
“There are no rights when there is no family.”   Her remark raised very 
important issues of how rights and entitlements can be embedded in 
family relations, leaving those excluded from family support in difﬁcult
circumstances indeed.
I will highlight  some themes that emerge strongly through many of the 
interviews, which combine structural and subjective elements, and then 
proceed to a more detailed discussion of responsibility and choice.
Education before marriage: “No man is worth a university 
education”
It is not surprising  that education and the quest for education ﬁgures
in these narratives but it is striking how dominant it is, particularly 
for women whose education is at risk.  Consider Mariam,  now 52, a 
refugee who has lived all her life in Breij Camp in Gaza who ﬁnally
obtained a degree from Jerusalem Open University at the age of 44 after 
at least three failed attempts at higher education, one thwarted by the 
Israeli occupation who wouldn’t allow her to leave the country without 
surrendering her identity card, one by UNRWA policy which forbad 
two members of the same family from obtaining UNRWA scholarships, 
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and one by the Lebanese civil war where she could not take her place 
at Lebanon’s Beirut Arab University because she was refused a visa. 
Mariam, who received at least twenty marriage proposals, turned them 
all down to ﬁnish her education.
I received no less than twenty offers in the stages of my life 
since I was in the second basic class and I refused the subject 
because Mariam wanted to continue her education  and to be 
necessary to society.  
Fathers supporting daughters
The role of fathers in supporting their daughters’ education is equally 
prominent.  Zahera’s father, a teacher of religion and mathematics, 
was trusted by his community to take not only Zahera, but ﬁve other
girls, to settle them in various universities in Egypt in the early sixties. 
Encouraging education was often accompanied by a lack of pressure to 
marry.  Ilham’s father told her:  “Ya binti, there is no man in the world 
that is worth a university degree.”  
Hania, then in her late twenties and  working in UNRWA’s Department of 
Education, was supported by her father in going to the United Kingdom 
for a year’s training program in the early 1960s.   Her parents also did 
not pressure her to marry:
My parents knew me, they never tried to convince me or to 
socialize for marriage purposes.  They would tell me the pluses 
or minuses of a suitor – he’s from a good family, etc., but not try 
to convince me – they told each other ”If she is unmarried and 
unhappy, she’ll get a divorce and t they couldn’t handle that.’
Given the evident zeal with which fathers encouraged their daughters, it 
is interesting to speculate how these “liberal” fathers  were inﬂuenced by
prevailing nationalist and accompanying “modernist” ideas  where female 
education was central to notions of national renewal and the modern family.
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However,  the drive to educate daughters was not conﬁned by class or
even by modernist forms of life.   Suha from Mughazi camp in Gaza was 
encouraged by her illiterate mother to continue her education after the 
death of her father. Tahani, growing up in a small northern West Bank 
town in the eighties, noted:  
My parents wanted their children to be educated above all else. 
They didn’t have a chance themselves.  The North wasn’t like 
Ramallah.  Excuse me but I have to say that Christians made 
a difference.  I was surprised when the mother of my friend in 
Ramallah played the piano.
Effects of war and occupation: “I could not think of marriage”
War and occupation not only remove marriageable men or dislocate 
and separate family, kin and social groups that form marriage pools, but 
can  also change young women’s goals in life, re-direct attention away 
from marriage and to other forms of responsibility, whether family or 
national.
Rather unique patterns of marriage and singlehood in Palestine, as 
Halabi’s proﬁle in this volume notes, raise the questions of whether and
how the serial conﬂicts, uncertainties, forced migration and exiles in
Palestine have shaped marriage markets and  marrigeability.   At the very 
least, as one women in her mid-ﬁfties said in an understated way about
the occupation– it was “distracting.”  Coming back from her university 
studies in Cairo in 1971, Zahera noted:  “No, I was not thinking of 
marriage.  It was the start of occupation and that was on my mind.” 
Several women who came of age slightly before or slightly after the 
Israeli occupation in 1967 echoed Zahera’s words.
Hania, 28 years old at the time of the occupation, an UNRWA teacher, 
and from a Jerusalem Christian  family, was clear that the migration of 
men of her background circumscribed her marriage choices:  
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“Many men who were studying weren’t allowed to come back.  I 
could socialize with people, friends, but somehow they weren’t 
in the league for marriage.”  
Abla, however, adds an interesting  and contrary twist.  Originally from 
a family of high social standing in Jaffa, she faced new suitors after the 
1967 war – well-off men from Haifa came courting in Ramallah. 
“ Maybe I should have been ﬂattered but I resented them.  They
were dull. I didn’t want to marry any of them.  I wanted to 
explore life more.”
Political activism:  putting emotions on the side
Political activism, particularly after 1967, could (and did) create new 
marriage pools but individual activism and that of other family members 
also brought hardship, emotional turmoil, and increased responsibility:
Mariam spent long years as a militant women activist in the difﬁcult
conditions of a Gaza refugee camp under Israeli military occupation and 
casts her political activism both as a responsibility and as a consolation 
for lack of other opportunities:
It’s impossible to sit and be silent, I must be active.  True the 
circumstances are on everyone and every group in Palestinian 
society and there is a lack of opportunities for work and the 
opportunities for education failed but my consolation was that 
Mariam would be someone in the society.
For her, political activism consumed personal life and emotions:
“There were many relations with male colleagues in nationalist 
and community work but we put our emotions on the side.”
Tahani, 35 years old, a university graduate and  currently the head of a 
department in a Palestinian Ministry , comes from a poor family from a small 
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town in the northern West Bank  and grew up during with the resistance and 
repression dynamics of the 1980s and ﬁrst intifada.  As a child she make
ﬂags for martyrs from jacket linings as her family couldn’t afford to buy
fabric.  Her closest relation was with her younger brother who came to live 
with her in Ramallah when he joined Birzeit University.  When he was shot 
and killed by the Israeli army in a student demonstration, she says:
When my brother went, my whole dream also vanished.   I still 
don’t visit anyone and I always see him in my dreams, always 
a child…When anyone gets close, I move away.  In my ofﬁce, I
am like an embryo surrounded by a spider net.  No one can get 
close.”
Male migration:  “My brothers were all outside”
Male migration of potential marriage partners, as was the case with 
Hania,  might be more obvious cause of singlehood for women, but what 
was more prominent and mentioned far more often  in our narratives was 
the absence of brothers – with the consequence that daughters were left 
to cope with  war and occupation, family crisis, whether of income loss, 
old age of parents, or sickness.  The absence of brothers also directly 
affected marrigage – Suha, for example, kept deferring marriage until 
her brother got out of prison, or later, returned from exile.
Ilham’s mother died when she was twelve, leaving behind four older sons 
and four younger daughters. When the June 1967 war started, Ilham, her 
sisters and friends  went to the Jordanian governor of Nablus demanding 
training. Sent to a school, they were left without any communication and 
ﬁnally had to ﬁnd their way home.
I was with my sisters and my father was alone in the house; 
all my brothers were outside the country.  We left the school in 
small groups and decided to go through the Old City, thinking 
it would be harder for the Israelis to be there.   People were 
very sad and very angry, some were crying….  At home, it was 
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a night of horror.  We were afraid, remembering Deir Yassin. 
We closed all the shutters.  In the morning, we opened our door 
and saw some houses with white ﬂags.  This made us angry,
and we started to write down the names, we thought we should 
report them as traitors.  Then we found out that the town was 
under Israeli control.  It was very hard to accept.  I opened the 
window and saw Israeli tanks on the street. I felt like they were 
moving on my body.  I even thought of throwing myself out of 
the window, committing suicide.  It was too much for my mind.
In Zahera’s case, she was left supporting the family mainly from her 
teacher’s salary because one brother went to Saudi Arabia where he 
founded a family and had his own expenses and another, after a stint 
in Israeli prison, left the country and joined the resistance in Lebanon. 
Mariam stayed in the house to be responsible for her mother and younger 
children because “my brothers were outside in Iraq.”
Families and Responsibility:  “The education of my brothers 
and sisters is a priority”
The pattern of an unmarried daughter taking on the care of elderly 
parents is clearly present in Palestinian society and indeed may have 
increased with the migration of sons, the nuclearization of households, 
and increased longevity.  But there are also other patterns of family 
care:  particularly responsibilities towards the education of younger 
children, especially when the father is dead or incapacitated, but also 
when household resources are limited. A common phenomenon in 
Gaza in the 1970s, fuelled by UNRWA education, was for unmarried 
refugee girls to become teachers in the Gulf and support other family 
members.  Rosenfeld ﬁnds this same pattern in Dheisheh refugee camp
in Bethlehem. (Rosenfeld 2004).   Teaching or other work abroad to 
support younger members of the family delayed marriage.  This could 
result in singlehood – but also could result in marriage opportunities as 
a bride with some ﬁnancial resources in hand.
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Zahera returning to Jerusalem from her university education in Cairo in 
1970  and already a political activist, was the oldest of eight children. 
She found a job teaching physics in UNRWA and almost immediately 
faced the death of her father:
At that moment I had to take some decisions. The ﬁrst one I took
was that about the building of a tomb for my father. I said ‘I will 
not do it.  I don’t want to spend the money.  We are poor and there 
are other priorities.  The second decision was not to do the food for 
the mourning period. We send the food to the orphans school and 
my mother agreed.   Then I decided I would make a birthday for my 
youngest sister, three days after the funeral.  She was very attached 
to my father and I thought she needed to have her birthday.  I also 
turned on the television – it was a house full of children and they 
needed to be normal.  Also, I did not wear black. 
Zahera stressed her most fundamental decision: 
What I decided is that the education of my brothers and sisters 
is a priority
Sitt Afaf, an older woman interviewed in the mid-1980s by Moors was 
apprenticed to a seamstress in the late Mandate period after ﬁnishing the
seventh grade.  She successfully ran her own sewing workshop until the 
beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967.  Like Zahera,  the key event 
was her father’s sudden death and her responsibility for the family. She 
remained unmarried and says: 
“I was responsible for my mother and seven children.  I let them 
study, I married them and I opened a house. When one a good 
man came to ask for me in marriage, I sat with him and explained 
I was not able to marry because I had three responsibilities: my 
mother, my youngest sister who had just been appointed as 
a teacher, and my brother’s son, who I had raised and whose 
engineering study I was paying for.  Then he asked whether he 
would be allowed to meet my youngest sister. I told him ‘that is 
possible’.  He married her.  (Moors 1995, 193)
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Mariam  decided to take care of the care of  the family household in Breij 
camp and remains living with and supporting her mother to this day:
When I ﬁrst opened my eyes to work, it was in the house because
I had got my secondary school degree and was the oldest (of 
the sisters) and affairs were complicated in the house and it was 
necessary for someone to stay in the house and my brothers were 
outside on a journey to Iraq.  My brother’s name had been put 
forward by UNRWA and they don’t give accept two from the 
same family  so I thought that education did not have a speciﬁc
age and I took a decision to stay in the house.”
Palestinian conditions of insecurity and danger add to the more universal 
burdens attached to the care of the elderly, especially when the carer is 
alone.  Abla says:
A landmark was the ﬁrst intifada, it was very tough for us, often
staying indoors and then there were curfews.  I was afraid to go 
downtown but I had to shop for us.  I started feeling lightheaded, 
dizzy, I was anxious.  I resented having to be with an older person 
at this time, that I had no siblings to share the burden.  I really 
had no one to support me,
Nida, working in media and teaching, ﬁnally was able to move out her
family home in a lower-income suburb when she was in her late thirties. 
Nonetheless, within one year her mother was living with her, an arrangement 
that continues to be difﬁcult for Nida who feels her space and creativity
withering away without the solitude and independence she craves.
Marrigeability and being “out of place”
A number of interviewees saw dislocation – being out of place – as 
affecting their life course Ilham moved to Nablus when she was six and 
idealizes her childhood freedom in Jaffa by the sea, considering Nablus 
as “between two mountains” and a prison.
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There were really no approaches for marriage proposals to my 
father.  I think there were two reasons.  The ﬁrst  is that I was
too out of place. My sister, for example, had loads of proposals, 
she was sweet and docile.   Recently, a woman  described what 
I looked like to her and her friends in Nablus when I was that 
age and she was younger: “As if you had come from Mars.  So 
different from everyone else in town,   we admired you.”  
The second reason Ilham noted was her crippled arm, saying “No one 
wanted a wife with one and a half arms.”
Suha, from Mughazi camp spent much of her adult life in Lebanon with her 
mother and a brother who was preoccupied with his own family, as well as the 
Palestinian resistance. One of her explanations for not getting married was: 
.. our dispersed situation in Lebanon.  I only had one brother 
in Lebanon. He was thinking of his children and I was sitting 
there.  All these circumstances make one think of onesself.  And 
when we came here [to Gaza] one had gotten old.  Khlas the 
possibility of thinking of marriag.
Marrigeability, Choice and Ideal Partners: “A Choice of Sorts”
Several women cited ideals of marriage partners that conﬂicted with
the marriage offers they received.   Hania was offended by suitors who 
courted her as a young women because of her family’s status:
“It  was because I was Kamal and Nabiha’s daughter, not because 
I was myself.  They lumped us all together “the Khoury  girls.”  
She developed her own ideas of a suitable marriage partner:
I had a problem. I couldn’t consider marrying someone when the 
person was weaker than me.  I wanted an equal relationship.  I 
didn’t want to boss or be bossed. 
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Nida, reﬂecting on her relationships with men, believes she held
impossibly high ideals of partners3 partly to avoid real possibilities of 
marriage.
“When a man began to be interested in me, I would be bored. 
Oh no, I wouldn’t want to spend the rest of my life with him. 
Mish Ma’oul, he isn’t up to my view of life.”
The example of the unhappy marriage of her mother, married at thirteen 
to a man who mistreated and then abandoned her,  also inﬂuenced her,
Nida says.  She deﬁed her older brother, the breadwinner of the family,
to go to university while he was pressuring her to get married. Her 
reﬂections on her relationships are complex, but she ends with saying
that not being married is “a choice of sorts” for her.   
Suha viewed choice and the course of her life in a different way.  Citing 
as well the disruption of Lebanon noted above, she replied to the question 
of whether she choose being unmarried this way:
“Walahi, it was not my choice, nor that of another person.  It 
was the situation and the circumstances the difﬁcult nights   we
lived in that forced us into work And then you get distracted 
by work and your doings and work and you have money and 
spend on yourself.   There was no pressure on me in the house.  I 
drank and eat and dressed and went out as I wanted.  There was 
no pressure on me and money was in my pocket. All this didn’t 
leave me to think of marriage.  
Zahera explains that when she was young, marriage proposals came to 
her family and then she was addressed directly by suitors:
I was responsible for the family and didn’t say yes.  But then 
it becomes your  (my) decision, it’s not what you want.  What 
3 Dreiskins (2006) interviewing young professional women in contemporary Beirut found that 
contradictions in marriage ideals – where young women wanted a “modern” man who did housework but 
also had traditional attributes like wealth, status, and even jealousy and virility – inhibited marriage.
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you want when you are young, you don’t when you are older.  I 
value the freedom and space, I don’t want to lose it.  I am happy 
with my life.  It was my decision and I go with it.  If my life was 
repeated, I will do it again.”
Mariam, who rejected twenty suitors in pursuit of her education, seems 
to take simultaneous positions of decision and no choice, of the value 
of female education – she wishes three times that all girls get education 
– and advice to young women to get married. She says:
It was my decision not to get married…. But no girl decides 
not to get married and she thinks of the ties and marriage and a 
living life and children. I was active in the house and the family 
gave freedom to girls and respected girls’ opinion so much so 
that my father shouted at my brother on my behalf.   This made 
Mariam look for Mariam inside herself and that Mariam should 
be an inﬂuential force in the environment that was around her….
I hate the word “I” in my talk, but my experience says that my 
advice to girls is that any opportunity for marriage is suitable.” 
In her 1997 novel The Inheritance, Sahar Khalifeh gives a powerful, if 
conventional, portrait of Nahleh, an unmarried woman who has returned 
to the West Bank after living with her brother in the heady revolutionary 
days of Lebanon:
When he told me the story of Beirut and the revolution, she sang 
the story of a house and children… His was a love story, hers 
was a story of hunger for a loving touch.  His was the story of 
a leader and a rock, and hers was about the small concerns of a 
schoolteacher who began her life a radiant woman and ended a 
spinster. A spinster? A spinster! A ﬂat word that conjures selﬁsh
personal worries and a barren woman, one like the fallow 
land, unappealing and uninspiring, like a land without rain.” 
(Khalifeh 2005, 47)
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Dreams of Youth
Khalifeh’s bleak vision may be a dominant one, but other visions 
are starting to contend. In several focus groups  in Amari refugee 
camp with girls of different ages,  girls were adamant that they 
didn’t want early marriage and most preferred to postpone until after 
university education.  Most planned some combination of work and 
marriage for their future, although one girl in the eighth grade, who 
had problems in school,  was quite clear that she wanted to be a 
wife and mother as her main occupation.  In another focus group, a 
seventeen-year old whose ambition is to be a television journalist, 
took a more unusual track:
“I want to work and I don’t want to marry.  What if Shireen [a news 
correspondent from Palestine for the Al Jazeera network]  was married 
– they wouldn’t let her move around.” (Johnson 2006, 14)
Delayed marriage and the new Ramallah:   the paradox
In two extended interviews with four unmarried women in their twenties 
and early thirties that share an apartment in the Um Shariet neighborhood 
of Ramallah,  conducted by IWS researchers in 2004 ,  some of the 
contradictions facing young professional women emerged sharply.  Fida 
in her early thirties and the most successful of the young women as an 
engineer managing a large project, is a returnee to her father’s Ramallah-
area village, but grew up in Arab cities, She observes that mothers in her 
village have a sharp eye out for young women with good salaries, given their 
sons’ difﬁculties with employment, and poses herself as quite marriageable,
but not necessarily interested right now. (Silmi 2005). For another young 
woman, however,  her working life in Ramallah turned out to be a marriage 
liability. From a northern West Bank  village, she became engaged last year 
to a young man from her village.  After they wrote the marrige contract, the 
young man wanted to dissolve the marriage and they went before the qadi. 
The reason the young man gave: she had become like “banaat Ramallah,” 
and her ways were not suitable for him. The qadi dissolved the marriage. 
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In this last example,  young unmarried women in Ramallah pose a 
seemingly new, and disturbing model, at least to some parts of society. 
Our interviews with older generations of  unmarried women make us 
question how “new” independent and unmarried working women are 
in Palestinian society and more important, offer models of contribution 
to society and self development – as well as burdens undertaken and 
responsibilities met – that problematize, and even overturn, the “problem” 
of unmarried women.
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Communities and Identities in Situ
Lisa Taraki
The Institute  of Women’s Studies Three Communities 
in Wartime research project* is a multi-faceted 
examination of the ways in which individuals, 
families, communities, formal organizations, informal 
associations, and social groups have confronted, 
shaped, and been affected by the profound 
transformations wrought by the second intifada and 
Israeli attempts to suppress it since September 2000. 
At present, the research team is producing a volume (in 
Arabic) proﬁling the  Ramallah-area communities under
study – Am’ari refugee camp, Umm al-Sharayit, and 
Masyoun – and exploring themes raised in interviews 
conducted over three years in these communities.  In 
this brief excerpt from her introductory chapter, Lisa 
Taraki  situates the three communities in the larger 
social universe of Ramallah and al-Bira and points 
to signiﬁcant differences in the making of community,
identity and place in the three settings.
* The Institute thanks the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for its support for the Three 
Communities in Wartime Project. 
On the face of it, the three communities described and analyzed in the 
Institute of Women’s Studies Three Communities in Wartime research 
project would appear to neatly capture three social prototypes within the 
Ramallah-al-Bira urban formation. They also happen to lie contiguously 
along an east-west axis, starting from the poorest and most densely 
populated community in the east (Am`ari refugee camp) and ending 
with Masyoun, the wealthiest and most sparsely inhabited neighborhood 
in the west (Masyoun).  Masyoun is a relatively older, predominantly 
residential upper middle class area of villas, apartment buildings, 
and a small number of upscale commercial establishments such as 
hotels and restaurants. In between is the new community of Umm al-
Sharayit, a sprawling, rapidly growing, and relatively new community 
of predominantly multi-story apartment buildings inhabited by lower 
middle- and middle-class families of migrants from other regions in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and families relocated from the Ramallah-
al-Bira area. 
One of the aims of the research project was to study the social 
construction of community in these three socially disparate locations, 
and to ascertain the meanings of community and neighborhood for 
families and individuals; did the residents of these three areas or 
neighborhoods1 conceive of themselves as a community, what were the 
manifestations of community solidarity and identiﬁcation, and what was
the role of institutions, whether formal or informal, in the construction 
of community and place-based solidarities?  Was the community a 
framework for action, and of what kind?
1 Local residents use neither “community” or “neighborhood” to refer to these areas.   In fact, the 
term “community” is not part of the everyday language of people.  The camp is referred to as al-
mukhayyam (the camp), while the other two areas are referred to as “areas” (manatiq).  Recently, the 
word hayy (roughly, neighborhood) is used for Masyoun. Of the three areas, “camp” has the most 
solid and enduring meaning.  Use of the term “community” in this study, therefore, should not be 
construed as an attempt to reify a social category that does not necessarily exist in local classiﬁca-
tory schemes. 
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This introduction seeks to situate the three communities within the larger 
social universe of Ramallah-al-Bira.  Such contextualization is necessary 
because the particularities of the three locales can be understood more 
fully if they are set against the features of the larger urban formation 
of which they are a part. In particular, the construction of place in each 
of the three communities is best viewed as a continuously negotiated 
and contentious process that is linked to the ever-changing dynamics of 
city-making in Ramallah-al-Bira as a whole. Within this social-spatial 
universe, neighborhoods and areas rise and fall, their material and 
symbolic values ﬂuctuate, and their economic and social signiﬁcance
changes continually.  The unique mix of economic, political, social, and 
symbolic forces that have shaped the construction of the social universe 
of Ramallah-al-Bira must be foregrounded, in order to appreciate 
the speciﬁcities of the particular locales under study. History is also
important.  Massey, observing that the speciﬁcity of place derives from
the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and 
more local social relations, has noted that these relations interact with 
and take a further element of speciﬁcity from the accumulated history
of a place, with that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon 
layer of different sets of linkages, both local and to the wider world 
(Massey 1994: 156).
Delving into history in our case means identifying meaningful moments 
and social relations in the eventful twentieth century.  The decisive 
moments were largely dictated by the turbulent political history of 
the world and Palestine, primarily the First and Second World Wars, 
the British Mandate, the Nakba of 1948, the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967, and the Oslo agreement in 1993. Signiﬁcant
social relations, themselves shaped by these momentous events, were 
embodied in social networks traversing and linking territories in and 
beyond Ramallah-al-Bira and Palestine.  Before we do that, however, we 
need to draw together some of the basic features of the three communities 
under study.
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Boundaries, Networks, and Mobility
The overall picture that emerges from the three community proﬁles points
to the denseness of social relations and the heightened sense of community 
in Am`ari camp, compared to the remarkable lack of community in 
Masyoun, the upper-class neighborhood, and a weak sense of community 
in Umm al-Sharayit, the new community of migrants. Johnson notes in 
her proﬁle of Am’ari  refugee camp that Am`ari can be viewed as the
most cohesive and self-identiﬁed of the three communities under study;
in fact, it is both a place of exclusion and isolation. Furthermore, the 
active presence of several local organizations in the camp is signiﬁcantly
different than the other two communities under study, and another way 
of marking Amari as a community Umm al-Sharayit, in contrast, is a 
new community lacking in self-identity and in the kind of community 
organizations that characterize Am`ari camp. It is, as Hilal notes in his 
proﬁle,“liberated from a memory heavily laden with symbolism and
hierarchies of family, class and region” (Hilal proﬁle: 105).  Masyoun,
the upscale residential community proﬁled by Silmi, is the closest to
the globalized suburban community, composed mainly of single-family 
residences but with creeping multi-story apartment buildings. It is 
totally devoid of community organizations such as a popular committee 
or clubs; its residents frequent institutions and belong to organizations 
outside the community. 
Thus, we ﬁnd that the density of social relations, a shared history (as in
the case of Am`ari camp), and the existence of organizations are indeed 
important markers of a community.  Hilal notes in his proﬁle of Umm al-
Sharayit that the existence or absence of community may be a function of 
the density and diversity of social relations Some of the early observations 
by the research team force us to question the concept of community or 
neighborhood as a bounded place. Researchers noted the marked ﬂuidity
of the boundaries of the three communities, especially the line separating 
Am`ari camp from Umm al-Sharayit. A great deal of movement between 
the two neighborhoods was recorded in the many interviews conducted by 
the research team, and we began to understand that shifting boundaries are 
not only a reﬂection or expression of the considerable change of residence
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from one community to the other, or of patterns of physical expansion of 
built-up areas beyond the boundaries of the two areas. They also have to 
do with the dynamic and ever-changing nature of social networks spilling 
out over community boundaries.  As noted in the proﬁles for the adjoining
communities of Am`ari camp and Umm al-Sharayit, the social worlds 
of people in each of these two places include individuals and families 
from the other place, indicating that community is not only spatial, but 
social as well.  Indeed, and in the words of Massey, we must surmount 
the misidentiﬁcation of place with community; communities can exist
without being in the same place (Massey 1994: 153). 
This observation is most pertinent in the case of the upper-class Masyoun 
area, where signiﬁcant social relations lie outside the boundaries of the
neighborhood. If the residents do belong to a community, then it is a 
community whose members are linked by common practices, activities, 
and sensibilities and not a common physical space. That this kind of 
community has come into being is itself a comment on the changing 
patterns of sociality in the social universe of Ramallah, one stamped 
by the unique signature of the middle and upper-middle-class. The two 
other communities, however, demonstrate another more prevalent social 
pattern in practice. In Am`ari and Umm al-Sharayit, the social networks 
and relations that are signiﬁcant in the lives of the people living there are
mostly familial. In Umm al-Sharayit, since the majority of the residents 
are recent migrants to the area, they are still intimately connected with 
their families in their places of origin. Many are employees of Ramallah 
and al-Bira institutions, having settled in Ramallah since the imposition 
of strict restrictions on mobility after 2000 in the wake of the second 
intifada. For the residents of Am`ari camp, their social worlds, while 
more solidly located within the camp itself, also include important 
familial nodes in other neighborhoods in Ramallah, including in the 
rapidly expanding adjacent village of Baytunia; in the rest of the West 
Bank; the Gaza Strip; as well as further beyond in the Arab world, 
especially in Jordan.
Having said this, it is important to realize that communities usually have 
an actuality in a speciﬁc place, even if this is not always embodied in
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concrete social relations embedded in the place itself. A community may 
also be constituted as an idea or a concept, upheld by social practices and 
representations as part of the conscious process of place-making.  This 
can be illustrated again by the case of the upper-class neighborhood of 
Masyoun. There, one can say, the very absence of a community is one 
of the most important assets of the place, both in the eyes of the people 
who live there and those who aspire to do so. The residents of Masyoun, 
unlike those in Umm al-Sharayit, do not seriously lament the lack of 
neighborliness and its trappings in the neighborhood.  On the contrary, an 
important part of the shared sense of “community” there is the prevailing 
lack or superﬁciality of relations.All of the residents interviewed claimed
that “people do not have time to build relationships with their neighbors,” 
a comment made without much regret and bordering on pride.  It would 
appear that what unites the people of Masyoun in a community is the 
consciousness of constituting a particular kind of community, a unique 
place; it is not one in which there are strong neighborly relations in 
everyday life, but one in which people “mind their own business” behind 
the gates of their stand-alone private homes. That “mark of distinction” 
is part of what Harvey (2001: 405) calls the collective symbolic capital 
which attaches to names and places.
To return to the issue of understanding communities in their wider contexts, 
it is useful to remember that communities, neighborhoods, and other 
socially signiﬁcant zones are located within spatial hierarchies created
by and reﬂecting social divisions within the larger social space of a city,
region, or nation.  Communities are ranked according to their value in the 
relevant markets, whether they are real estate markets or symbolic ones. 
While Masyoun sits on land whose price has skyrocketed in recent years, 
its social valuation as an elite area is not solely determined by the price 
of land in the economic market.  Value in the symbolic market is just as 
important, and maintaining this value means, above all, maintaining the 
distinctiveness of the place. The resentment of some Masyoun residents 
towards the municipality, which, in their view, has violated zoning 
regulations by giving in to the demands of real estate speculators to build 
apartment buildings in the area (See Silmi, 2007), is a commentary on 
the importance of Masyoun as a distinguished place, even if the place 
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itself is not the locus of the social activities of its residents. Perhaps 
this is what Amira Silmi has in mind when she notes that the anxiety 
about the encroachment of multi-storey apartment buildings and the 
invasion of “privacy” expressed by many of the residents of Masyoun 
is not uneasiness about over-crowding in the neighborhood per se, but a 
reﬂection of the desire of all its residents, irrespective of their histories
and experiences, to maintain class boundaries.
This is hardly unique for urban centers.  All modern cities have hierarchies 
of places and neighborhoods, reﬂected in their disproportionate value
in real estate and symbolic markets.  But this has not always been the 
case in Ramallah-al-Bira.  This urban center at the turn of the twenty-
ﬁrst century is a different social universe, an emerging city much more
conscious of rank and status, more self-consciously aware of its national 
standing, and increasingly differentiated along class lines.  
Fashioning Ramallah-al-Bira
I return to the idea that Ramallah-al-Bira is the product of critical events 
and moments in the turbulent modern history of Palestine, and that it 
was constructed out of a unique set of social relations and networks—
themselves born of this history--that have weaved in and out of that 
place.  Massey, arguing for a “global sense of place,” has noted that each 
place is a unique point of the intersection of global and local networks 
of social relations and movements and communication (Massey 1994: 
154).  The social networks and chains of communication and movement 
that have intersected in Ramallah-al-Bira extend all over the world, from 
Belize to Detroit, from Gaza city to Amman.2 We will have occasion to 
refer to some of these diasporic networks later.
In this context, it is relevant to refer to the debates about place-making 
of which Massey’s contributions are a part.  Arturo Escobar, surveying 
2 Sari Hanaﬁ (2001) has discussed different types of Palestinian diasporic networks and their
intersections in Palestine.
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the state of “the anthropology of place,” advocates a cross-fertilization of 
political economy and phenomenological or constructivist approaches to 
place-making; place is neither produced exclusively by structural factors 
(capital and global forces) nor by existential factors, or “the senses” 
(Escobar 2001: 150 - 153). In a similar vein, Thomas Gieryn, also surveying 
the sociological literature on place, has noted that the insights of political 
economy and urban ecology (a kind of “structural determinism”) must be 
balanced against an approach that recognizes that ordinary people extract 
from continuous and abstract place a bounded, identiﬁed, meaningful,
named, and signiﬁcant place; locality is as much phenomenological as
spatial (Gieryn 2000: 471). He argues, after Bourdieu (1990), for an anti-
reductionism and anti-determinism that precludes geographical fetishism, 
environmentalism, determinism, and unbridled social constructivism; 
the material and interpretive domains work both autonomously and in a 
mutually dependent way (Gieryn 467).
These admonitions have relevance to another point made earlier 
about history, when I noted that the decisive moments in the creation 
of Ramallah al-Bira were largely dictated by the turbulent political 
history of the world and Palestine. However, it should be noted that just 
as it is important not to fall into the trap of an exaggerated structural 
determinism or constructivism, it is also important not to ascribe 
excessive agency to “history.”  No place is “created” or produced by 
historical events; places may be obliterated, shattered, or transformed 
by momentous events like wars, occupations, and political agreements, 
but people’s agency—whether through collective action or individual 
and familial decisions—also shape places and give them their unique 
identities against the backdrop of the critical events.
Indeed, when we consider the trajectory of the twin cities over the last 
century, we ﬁnd that decisions of ordinary people—to emigrate to the
United States, send money to build a home in Ramallah or al-Bira, 
move the household from Nablus to Ramallah, borrow money from 
relatives in Amman, go to work as a teacher in Kuwait—while taken 
in the shadow of wars and occupation, have stamped the character of 
these places. Collective resistance has also been important in place-
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making in Palestine; for example, representations of Nablus (the 
“Mount of Fire”) and Jenin refugee camp (which acquired iconic 
status as a site of resistance during the Israeli invasion of 2002), are 
a reﬂection of resistance activity that has given them a special status
in the national imagination. Closer to home, the identity of Am`ari 
camp as a place is intimately linked with resistance to the occupation, 
especially during the ﬁrst intifada in the late 1980s.  While the camp
today has become a zone of exclusion and may be stigmatized by 
Ramallah’s middle and upper-middle class as a site of disorder and 
unruliness, it has also served as a surrogate conscience for the very 
same social groups in a different time and a different era.  During the 
ﬁrst intifada, for instance, the towns’ prosperous merchants paid their
political dues to the camp by supplying it with food and provisions 
during the long sieges, a practice that also involved nearby villages 
and Jalazon refugee camp.
Resistance activity has also resulted in severe punitive measures by the 
occupying forces on certain places, cutting them off from their economic 
and social networks and imposing states of siege and isolation upon 
them. Nablus, historically an important center of trade and production 
and a site of extensive investment after the Oslo accords, has been 
under siege and assault for varying periods since 2000, and has seen 
its landscape devastated, its economy ruined, and its borders sealed 
by military checkpoints controlling movement in and out of the city. 
Businesses have relocated to other parts of the West Bank, particularly 
Ramallah, and the town lives from one curfew to the next, from one 
military raid to the other.  Within the span of seven years, Nablus, the 
West Bank’s largest city and a crucial node in the Palestinian economy, 
has become an inaccessible place, a place of hardship and devastation.3 
In fact, the regime of closures and checkpoints, exacerbated by the wall, 
has transformed the West Bank into a number of isolated pockets where 
even the largest city is cut off from its hinterland and its traditional trade 
and social networks disrupted. The longer-term effects of such Israeli 
3 For an excellent insight into the ambience of Nablus under siege, see Doumani (2004).
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measures are slowly beginning to emerge: the contraction of Palestinians’ 
social worlds, and the introduction of new forms of localism, including 
the curious case of a “cosmopolitan” localism in Ramallah, as insulated 
from the rest of Palestine as the “localized” localisms of insular Hebron 
or Nablus (Taraki and Giacaman 2006: 32).
Finally, it is fruitful to recognize, as Gieryn has noted, the play of 
agency and contingency as signiﬁcant forces in place-making (Gieryn
2000:469).  A host of political and geographic contingencies intersected 
with individual and collective actions and practices to make the place 
that is called Ramallah-al-Bira. These two towns have become the center 
of political and cultural life in Palestine today, overshadowing East 
Jerusalem, which until the 1990s was the occupied territories’ main urban 
center.  The establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the transfer 
of its main institutions to Ramallah-al-Bira, buttressed by Israeli policies 
of siege and encirclement, recently culminating in the total sealing off 
of the Palestinian city from the rest of the West Bank, have seriously 
eroded the viability of East Jerusalem as a coherent urban center.
Before we trace the unfolding of this story, a note on nomenclature is in 
order.  Ramallah and al-Bira continue to be two administrative entities, 
each with its own municipality and municipal council.  However, the 
social and physical boundaries between the two have all but dissipated, 
and attachment to distinctive town identities survives only among 
the “original” natives who today constitute a small proportion of the 
population in the two towns.  Al-Bira has a somewhat problematic 
relationship with Ramallah, having been marginalized and sidelined, in 
both the cultural and political sense, by Ramallah.  In current usage, the 
term Ramallah generally subsumes al-Bira. Two of the three communities 
studied here, Am`ari camp and Umm al-Sharayit, actually fall under al-
Bira municipal jurisdiction, but for all intents and purposes their residents 
consider that they are living in “Ramallah.”  However, the matter is not as 
straightforward or as simple as it may appear.  The assertion of an Am`ari 
eighth-grader that “I like to go to Ramallah because there is no occupation 
there” (Johnson 2006, 5) shows that there is not one but several Ramallahs. 
Exploring how this came about is one of the tasks of this chapter.
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The Role of Non Governmental Organizations 
in Supporting Palestinian Women in Elections
Hadeel Rizq - Qazzaz
This article is excerpted from research conducted 
by Dr. Hadeel Rizq-Qazzaz for the Jerusalem 
Center for Women to evaluate the programs 
of  women’s organizations’ and other NGOs  to 
increase Palestinian women’s participation in 
local and parliamentary elections (2004-2006). 
Qazzaz raises questions of efﬁciency, such as
targeting and duplication of activities that may be 
familiar to observers of the NGO ﬁeld in Palestine
or elsewhere.  Of particular interest, she employs 
interviews – with women candidates, participants 
in training programs, and NGO and women’s 
organization activists – that show that women’s 
participation in elections can have contradictory 
results (both positive and negative)  rather than 
constituting  a straight path to greater democracy. 
Particularly in the local elections, women may stand 
in for other family members, or be deployed by 
political factions without real political participation. 
An analysis that goes beyond “counting women” 
is clearly called for and the Review is grateful to 
Qazzaz for translating and revising this portion of 
her research for publication.  
In both the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 
and the phased local elections of 2004 and 2005, women’s organizations 
and other NGOs in Palestine launched initiatives to increase women’s 
political participation, with a strong focus on strengthening the 
capabilities of potential candidates through workshops and training 
sessions.  Amendments to the election laws that provided quotas1 for 
women also encouraged more women to stand as candidates.   Did these 
NGO programs and activities make and difference, and if so, how?   Has 
women’s political participation been strengthened by such activities?    In 
order to make a preliminary assessment, a questionnaire  was circulated 
to women who either ran for elections or had expressed an interest in 
doing so asking them to evaluate the effectiveness of NGO activities and 
whether their needs were addressed.  There were responses from 147 
women.  Another twenty women were interviewed in depth.  In addition, 
interviews were conducted with twenty-three women’s organizations or 
other NGOs that had programs on supporting women’s participation in 
elections to identify the way they designed their programs and how they 
reach out to their constituencies. 
Background
Palestinian women participated in national elections in 1996 when 672 
candidates, 27 of whom were women (15 from Gaza and twelve from the 
West Bank) competed for the eighty-eight seats of the ﬁrst Palestinian:
Legislative Council (PLC). The percentage of women candidates was 
around 4%. Five women won the elections constituting about 6% of 
the total number of the legislative council members2. This proportion 
1  A  2005 amendment to the Election Law included a formula for women’s inclusion in election lists 
(one women in the ﬁrst three, one in the next four, and subsequently one in ﬁve) as well as other
changes such as increasing the overall  number of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council fron 
88 to 132.  An 2004 amendment for local elections guaranteed women two seats in each municipal 
or local council.
2  Among the women who won, three were from Gaza strip (Intisar Al Wazir, Rawya Al Shawwa, Jamila 
Saidam), and two from the West Bank (Hanan Ashrawi and Dalal Salameh)
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was lower than expected, given the long history of Palestinian women’s 
contribution and participation in the struggle. Habashneh (2002) argues 
that reasons behind the low representation of women are that the ﬁrst
elections took place shortly after the Palestinian Authority assumed 
power and before passing laws: thus no special quota or supportive laws 
were implemented.3 In addition, some political groups who may be more 
supportive to women’s participation boycotted the elections due to their 
opposition to the Oslo Accords.. At the same time the PNA was lacking 
experience and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to run modern and fair
elections process.
Between the years 2004-2005, local elections were held in several 
phases. At the beginning of 2006, the second election for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council took place in the Palestinian territories.  In both, an 
increase was evident in the number of women participating as candidates, 
partly due to the quota provisions.  Currently, of the 132 members of the 
Legislative Council, 17 or 13% are women. Women also obtained 300 
seats in the four-stage municipal elections. 
Disappointed by results in the 1996 elections, many women’s organizations 
and associations concentrated their efforts to increase the number of 
women candidates in elections. The quota provisions in the  2004 and 
2005 amendments to election laws attest to the women’s movement’s 
advocacy and interventions, even if those provisions, particularly at 
the parliamentary level, do not meet the movement’s demands. The 
signiﬁcance of the increase in successful women candidates in the
two elections, however, needs to be assessed.  In our interviews, many 
activists questioned whether the women elected would be able (or willing) 
to introduce women’s visions and perspective to parliament as well as the 
various municipal councils. Concern was also expressed that some elected 
women were inactive in public life and were elected for reasons of family 
inﬂuence, factional afﬁliation or tribal status.
3  See Habashneh, “Quota system: A positive intervention for equality and democracy”, 2002, Panorama 
Center.
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Who did NGOs target?
In the prelude to the local elections (2003), women’s organizations 
started working with women on election-related issues without setting 
a clear vision of who to target. Simultaneous, different and sometimes, 
contradictory training courses were taking place.. Also, the three-
month period between each electoral phase was insufﬁcient to allow
organizations to implement effective training. The training modules 
were designed in great haste rendering their role and impact negligible. 
The ambiguity surrounding the political situation in terms of postponing 
the elections and making last-minute changes to the law, forced NGOs 
to act frantically in order to cope with the ever-changing dynamics of 
the elections. 
Training was the major activities for most NGOs working on promoting 
woman's political participation. The bulk of time, resources and efforts 
were concentrated in training programs, raising awareness and promoting 
candidate competence. Half of the 147 women who were interviewed 
(by questionnaire) said they beneﬁted directly from the activities of
NGOs that support political participation of women, especially training 
and rehabilitation programs. An additional 21% said they indirectly 
beneﬁted from the change in the public attitudes towards women as
candidates. When asked about the type of programs that they attended. 
86% of women said that they beneﬁted from training programs; 22%
from advisory programs; 44% from social awareness campaigns, 33% 
from electoral campaigns management; 5% from ﬁnancing electoral
campaigns; and 4% from changing the electoral system. 
The trainee selection process also drew sizeable dissatisfaction and 
criticism. Opinions differ on whether NGOs targeted the right groups in 
their training and programming. Some believe that these organizations 
targeted women candidates who clearly beneﬁted from the training and
gained skills and information they needed. Others, however, believe 
that the training programs were hastily implemented and were designed 
to attract large numbers of participants. Some expressed concern that 
such programs were  directed at fulﬁlling conditions set by international
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donors in the hope of securing future funds, thus, compromising the 
standard of design and implementation for the sake of producing reports 
that seem impressive on paper yet lacking in quality programming. 
A staggering 67% of women interviewed, indicated that they had 
participated in recurring, and often similar, activities with two or more 
NGOs. This indicates that these organizations targeted the same group 
of women most of the time.
Targeting the right group?
Considerable evidence suggests that the training did not target the right 
groups. Many organizations targeted well-known women activists who 
had both the ambition and the experience to run for elections. In some 
cases, organizations targeted either their own members or members of 
established political parties. A woman, who won in the elections, criticized 
the role of NGOs, saying: “I think that they [NGOs] worked with certain 
women afﬁliated with political parties or who top the list while, in fact,
ignoring the base. I would say to these organizations that many women are 
more accepted by society than the ones you know. Go look for them.” 
Women interviewed pointed to a gap between those targeted and those 
women who actually needed training. They claimed that many women 
received training for elections but were either unable to get nominated 
by their parties, whereas the majority of those who were nominated did 
not receive training. Responsibility for the existence of such conundrum 
rests on both, the NGOs and the targeted groups, as organizations are 
thought to have traded the quality of service for size, while not enough 
women heeded the calls and invitations of NGOs. 
In numerous interviews with women who won in the local elections, it 
was revealed that many of the municipal candidates who won, in fact, 
did not receive any training in elections from any organization and have 
no experience whatsoever in municipal or community work. In addition 
they admitted that they had no time to dedicate for municipal work as 
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they held full-time jobs in the health, education or, the private sector. 
They are accused of having been tactically drawn to the elections to 
consume the quota system and leave no place for strong and qualiﬁed
women from other parties. 
In an interview a socially active ex-Fatah woman member said that 
she wanted to run in the elections so desperately, but due to internal 
conﬂicts within the faction, her name was not selected. She defected to
Islamic Jihad and ran on their list. She did not win and was eventually 
excommunicated by Fatah. 
In another case, a woman who was a midwife was nominated in Beit 
Hanoun as a Hamas representative in the municipal elections because she 
was popular and they knew she would win. Some commented, cynically: 
“she has assisted in delivering half of the town’s residents.’’
Another candidate from the Gaza Strip listed her husband’s phone 
number as her contact information. When a ﬁeldworker attempted to
reach her by phone to ﬁll out a questionnaire, her husband answered and
refused to let his wife speak with them, he asserted: “You can interview 
me if you want but my wife has nothing to do with the elections.” 
Another case is that of an elected member of a Gaza Strip municipal 
council, who admitted that she is a housewife and that she has not the 
time to attend to her responsibilities as a council member because she is 
too busy attending to her household chores and responsibilities. She added 
that other male municipal members told her that: “You can stay home, 
we will do all the work and your monetary compensation for attending 
the meetings will be sent to you at your home.”  In a central West Bank 
village, a council member said that she could not attend the sessions of 
the village council meetings without the company of her nephew, who is 
also an elected member. Another said that her father-in-law accompanies 
her to council meetings. These examples imply that there are many cases 
where women were pushed into the elections without any prior preparation 
or mentionable experience. Their intent to run in elections was thus 
undetectable to NGOs, hence, the failure to deﬁne them as target groups.
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Some target groups ignored
Most of the NGO activities targeted secular women from national political 
parties that are members of the PLO, ignoring Hams and independent 
candidates. A woman close to Hamas blamed the international boycott of 
Hamas for the exclusion of almost  all  Hamas candidates from training 
programs related to elections. An NGO staff member in Gaza? said it 
was overwhelmingly agreed among the majority of organizations not to 
engage in any activity with candidates from the Islamic movement, for 
fear of sanctions and loss of funding. 
Women interviewed in the West Bank faulted the NGOs for narrow 
means of communication and coordination, consisting mainly contacting 
municipal councils, meeting activists individually, and relying on 
candidates of their own selection. Hence, many independent and 
Islamic Movement candidates were excluded. This generated a sense of 
indifference and obliviousness to the role and signiﬁcance of NGOs.
When asked about how they learned about NGOs and their activities, 
50% of the women interviewed answered that local groups or political 
factions nominated them for training or other activities, thus implying 
that NGOs had solicited the services of women’s committees, political 
parties and other NGOs operating in the same area, to identify women 
who are likely to be interested in enrolling in training programs and the 
activities of these NGOs. This method was designed to exclude Hamas 
members either on basis of ideological differences or out if fear of donors 
halting funding.   Almost a ﬁfth of women learned about NGO activities
through personal contacts, whether family or political.
Some organizations said that they contacted the leading members of  local 
councils and sought their assistance to extend and distribute invitations 
among the candidate members of these councils. This method proved 
unreliable as many candidates said that either the male council heads 
failed to give them the invitations Other organizations received useful 
assistance from the local elections committee and the Central Elections 
Commission who gave them lists containing the names of candidates 
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after the nominations were concluded, Commission staff attended some 
NGO meetings to explain to women their rights and duties, the elections 
process and, electoral law. 
Not unexpectedly, only one percent of the women interviewed said they 
learned of NGOs and their activities via the mass media as NGOs relied 
the least on the use of mass media to publicize their missions, objectives 
and activities. 
In one case the employees of an organization, which works in civil 
education and democracy, conducted an unofﬁcial referendum in
villages and towns in one district about a woman who was who enjoyed 
wide-spread popularity and respect. Afterwards, they went to this 
woman and tried to convince her to run for the elections even if she 
wasn’t interested. In one of the villages in Ramallah, a woman, who 
is the director of the girls’ school in the village, recounted s how the 
man who works in this organization contacted her, her husband and 
children. He sat with each of them for long hours to convince them of 
the importance of her participation in local elections because the entire 
village respected and appreciated her. He was ﬁnally able to convince
her and her family to participate in a one-month training course about the 
political participation of women, The woman was convinced of the idea 
and joined later under the “Reform and change” list which is afﬁliated to
Hamas. The criteria of selection and support was popularity and respect 
– perhaps not unusual in selecting male political candidates as well –but 
not the feminist agenda.
Raising awareness among women electors
Various NGO’s played an important role in raising awareness among 
women voters of their rights and responsibilities. NGO’s, in general, and 
women organizations in particular, contributed in raising the awareness 
of society of the importance of elections and women participation as 
voters as well as candidates. 
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Various awareness campaigns were conducted targeting different 
segments of society especially women and youth. During the period 
that immediately preceded the elections several impassioned media 
campaigns were launched with a bevy of road-signs, radio and TV 
spots and newspaper advertisements. Many bore mottoes such as: “Your 
conﬁdence in women is your conﬁdence in your homeland”; and “When
they vote, women participate in decision-making.”
Inter-organizational coordination
Apart from their limited coordination during campaigns to enhance the 
political participation of women, no mentionable coordination to plan, 
to implement and, monitor and evaluate programs existed among NGOs. 
The absence of inter-organizational coordination led to the wasting 
of efforts and, in many cases, it resulted in program duplication. An 
interviewee stated that she had received the same training from two 
different organizations with two different trainers. 
Not only did the lack of inter-organizational affect the services NGOs 
provide, it also created aggressive competition over donor funding and 
further complicated progress as many organizations were unable to cope 
with the spending (burn-rate) requirements of donors and effectively 
implement programs and projects.
In Nablus, many local organizations hesitated to cooperate with 
larger or West Bank-wide organizations. They termed as “futile” their 
assessments and research requirements. A common belief that exists 
among the development community in the Northern region is that the 
larger organizations, based in the Central region [Ramallah], are “only 
interested in soliciting funds through assessments and research. They are 
accused of having little or on impact in the ﬁeld.”
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs attempted to assume the role of 
coordinator of NGO activities and extended invitations to the various 
organizations to enlist their effort and support to augment the efforts 
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and set a strategic plan of action to ensure efﬁciency and optimize
results. These efforts were aimed to ﬁnd creative ways to overcome the
challenges facing the empowerment of women to participate in public 
and political life. 
NGO achievements: Increased acceptance of women as 
candidates
The activities of civil society organizations, in general and women’s 
organizations in particular, contributed to the increase witnessed in 
social acceptance of women as candidates and as local and legislative 
council members. This achievement is the outcome of cumulative efforts, 
activities, programs, public awareness and media campaigns. 
Ratiﬁcation of the quota
Women organizations and civil society organizations played a vital role 
in the endorsement the quota system, especially in the local councils 
where it constitutes a unique step in the Arab region. Moreover, NGOs 
were able to inﬂuence political parties to give women better roles and
allow their nominations for elections. It is worth mentioning that before 
the woman quota system was approved, none of the political parties 
were willing to nominate women in advanced positions on their lists. 
But with the adoption of the quota, political parties became more open 
to, and accepting of women,s participation.
This did not protect the quota system from drawing criticism in that the 
system allows for unqualiﬁed and incompetent women to be nominated
in elections. The system, they argue, granted the party, faction, family 
or clan inﬂuence in the nomination of women for local and legislative
elections. An interview commented: “Women weren’t chosen on the 
basis of merit and qualiﬁcation; rather, they were randomly selected to
participate in elections [as candidates]. Moreover, many women were 
selected only to ﬁll the lists as deadlines were nearing. The political
Review of Women’s Studies88
parties were clever enough to choose women from inﬂuential and
powerful families.” Another said that “nominating women in this manner 
was only to ﬁll out space and satisfy the International Community and
not for the sake of national interest.”
Evaluation of performance
Inconsistent with their demographic representation, the results of the 
elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council showed that only 
seventeen women had won. Despite relatively weak representation in 
nominations, the preparations and efforts of Women organizations and 
cadres for the legislative council elections led to an increase in women 
participation as voters. 
Due to familial, tribal and factional considerations, that do not necessarily 
favor women, of 414 candidates running as candidates in the districts 
(where the list-based quota does not apply) only 15 women (less than 4%) 
participated.  In the national lists, there were, 314 candidates, of which70 
were women (22%). The manner in which political parties allowed women 
to run as candidates proves that they only did so to meet the requirements 
of the quota system imposed on them and not of their conviction that 
women participation is of any importance. Democratic and leftist parties 
where not exempt from gender discrimination. Women did not head any 
of their lists and were in second slots only on two of the Lists. 
Evaluations of candidates
Opinions concerning the effectiveness of NGOs and their programs 
varied among women candidates. However, many of them said that they 
hardly beneﬁted or did not beneﬁt at all from the programs. This opinion
was especially detected among those candidates who won in municipal 
councils as well as Hamas candidates. One of the members of the Nablus 
Municipal Council said that she did not receive any training related to 
the elections. 
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Another group of candidates stated that they decided not to attend 
the training courses terming them “repetitive and ineffective.” Not to 
mention, “time and resource wasting”, they declared that they found the 
training courses “very ordinary” as they dealt, mainly, with character 
and leadership skills. 
However, counter to their claim that they were not targeted for NGO 
training programs, many women candidates for the legislative council 
are said to have ignored the invitations of NGOs to participate and left 
their call unheeded. 
Conclusion
NGOs, especially women’s organizations, played a central role during 
local, presidential and legislative elections. Some contributed in raising 
public awareness on the importance of participating in the elections, the 
rights and duties of voters and candidates, in addition to monitoring the 
election process in all its stages. However, the most palpable achievement 
of NGOs and women organization is the ratiﬁcation of the quota system
into the law and allowing for relatively better representation of women. 
A woman said “the quota was ratiﬁed, thanks to the efforts of the
women’s movement.”  Nevertheless, signiﬁcantly increasing the number
of women the Palestinian Legislative Council will remain a distant 
ambition without a wider mobilization of women’s participation in 
public life. Thus, political parties are urged to begin to target women and 
activate party bases, especially the youth, to ensure wider participation 
of women in local and general elections.
Despite these accomplishments, many women activists believe that more 
could have been accomplished had, either the quota system been adopted 
in the electoral districts, as well as the lists, or if the electoral system was 
changed into a proportional system that guarantees women representation 
in each of the lists. However, some women activists expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the “type” of women who won as competence and 
merit were forfeited to achieve factional or tribal objectives. 
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Moreover, a general feeling exists that these accomplishments are 
too little compared to the amount of money and efforts expended on 
program projects that aim to empower the political participation of 
women. This is due to selective targeting in short-term programming 
that were not designed to be sustainable, whereas long term, consistent 
and sustainable social change is in fact required.  Moreover, the 
exclusion of Islamic candidates had an adverse impact on the results 
of the campaign as many women were either left out or boycotted 
the efforts of NGOs because of the implications and pressures of 
international donors who serve their own interests as opposed to those 
of Palestinian women and society. 
An important question remains whether enough attention is given to the 
different forms and types of the political participation of women and 
their involvement. Political participation, democracy, political diversity 
and gender, remain abstract notions for many ordinary housewives and 
non-working women. What went wrong and what can be build upon 
for wider and more sustained initiatives? These are challenges for the 
future work of the Palestinian women’s movement and civil society.
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R E V I E W S

Point of Debate:
The Human Rights Watch Report 
and Violence against Palestinian Women and Girls
Penny Johnson
Introducing a new feature of the Review of Womenʼs 
Studies, Point of Debate aims  to raise questions 
and encourage debate among researchers and 
activists in Palestine. The November 2006 report 
by Human Rights Watch on violence against 
Palestinian women and girls is discussed below in 
this spirit.  There are a number of speciﬁc issues
raised by the report that require reﬂection or  a
critical response.  More generally, a sustained 
discussion and analysis among activists and 
researchers in Palestine is needed to understand 
how international human rights frameworks might 
be either useful or problematic, or perhaps need 
adaptation or complementary strategies, to address 
violence  against Palestinian women and girls living 
under occupation, sustained warlike conditions, and 
a transitional and weakened Palestinian Authority.
Because Point of Debate is focused on raising critical 
questions, the review below does not fully cover all 
informational aspects of the Human Rights Watch 
report.  Readers will be interested in the report’s 
analysis of existing formal legislation1, interviews 
with counselors, lawyers, and police ofﬁcers, and
most movingly, the voices of women who have 
suffered severe domestic violence.
1  The analysis of the important informal legal system (customary law) is less helpful because of its 
broad generalizations on the operation of clan systems (hamula) in Palestinian society.
 In 1990,  Palestinian women activists and researchers gathered in the 
Friends School in Ramallah for a pioneering conference discussing 
domestic violence in the West Bank and Gaza.   The late Dr. Hala Atallah, 
a faculty member in Birzeit University’s Department of Education and 
Psychology , and Nadera Kervokian, then a graduate student and now 
a leading researcher on crimes against women, gave presentations. 
Atallah provided a comparative framework for understanding domestic 
violence while Kervokian, drawing on her doctoral research in the 
Jerusalem area, argued that violence against women in the home was a 
signiﬁcant issue and cut across classes and settings in Palestinian society. 
The researchers made no claims either for universal knowledge or for 
complete solutions --- but rather aimed to initiate a collective discussion 
among women’s movement groups, the legal profession and other 
interested parties in Palestine.  At the time, there was no press coverage, 
only the interest and resolution of women and men to better the welfare 
of Palestinian women and society, spurred by the mass mobilization of 
the ﬁrst intifada and given conﬁdence by the contribution of Palestinian
women and women’s organizations to the national struggle against 
occupation.  
Over ﬁfteen years later ,  in November 2006,  a respected NewYork-based
human rights organization, Human Rights Watch (HRW),  issued a major 
-- and problematic – report,  A Question of Security:  Violence Against 
Palestinian Women and Girls which  both raises and provokes a series of 
issues  for discussion and debate. The report argued that it was “already 
well established that violence against women and girls is a serious 
problem in the OPT,” (p. 4)  citing, inter alia,  new PCBS data that 23% 
of “married women in the West Bank and Gaza said that they had been 
victims of domestic violence in 2005”  (p. 36). Palestinian society was 
seen as unrelievedly patriarchal, with  the killing of Palestinian women 
in so-called “honor” crimes  termed “the most tragic consequences 
and graphic illustration of deeply embedded, society-wide gender 
discrimination.” (p. 49)   Although recognizing the present weakness, but 
not necessarily the transitional legal status, of the Palestinian Authority, 
the report laid much of the blame and accountability on that Authority 
for its failure to take decisive action.  Israel’s  continuing occupation, 
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siege and attack on PA institutions were acknowledged rather brieﬂy, 
but called “no excuse for inaction.” (p. 3)2
Coverage was extensive in the Western media.   In a  analysis of a  feature 
news  article on the HRW report in the New York Times, O’Connor and 
Roberts found that of eighty human rights reports by major human rights 
organizations on human rights abuses in the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict
since 2000, seventy-six were primarily critical of Israel, of which only 
two were featured in the New York Times, while of the four critical 
of Palestinians, two received such coverage, including the present 
report. Equally important, they argue that “by omitting crucial details 
and emphasizing certain others, The New York Times… has turned a 
valuable piece of human rights reporting in to a tool that can be urged to 
reinforce a Western agenda that has cynically exploited “saving Muslim 
women” as an excuse for dominating and abusing the rights of peoples 
from other cultures.” (O’Connor and Roberts, 2006).
Here is  a central  issue for debate and reﬂection. Taking into account
the present climate of imperial military intervention obviously does not 
mean a blanket condemnation of the work of Western-based human 
rights organizations on gender issues in the region: rather it demands 
a critical engagement and dialogue.  Even in 1990,  the presentations 
of Atalla and Kervokian in the Ramallah meeting were criticized by at 
least one participant in the conference as reﬂecting “Western agendas”: 
this is a dilemma with deep roots and histories. As Welchman and 
Hosain note:
Both the colonial heritage and contemporary global power 
structures (military, political, economic and others) necessarily 
complicate strategies of response to violence against women.” 
(Institute of Women’s Studies 2005,75)
2  It is particularly unfortunate that those who try to explain (or “justify”) the PA’s failure are dismissed 
as “defenders of the status quo.” (p. 3)
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Human rights interventions, whether global or local, must be judged by 
their effectiveness in assisting such strategies.
Reading and analyzing statistics: How prevalent is domestic violence 
against Palestinian women and girls and how severe?  Is it increasing? 
How do we assess crimes of violence?
The ﬁrst national-level survey of domestic violence, conducted by the
Palestinian Bureau of Statistics from 18 December 2005-18 January 
2006 with 4217 households in the West Bank and Gaza, is an important 
benchmark for assessing the prevalence and severity of domestic 
violence in Palestine. Unfortunately, data from this survey, as used in the 
HRW report, tends to be under-analyzed and possibly misleading.3   An 
example is HRW’s quote of a major ﬁnding that “23% of married women
in the West Bank and Gaza said that they had been victims of domestic 
violence in 2005” (p. 36) The report failed to add,  as PCBS does in its 
summary statement of the same ﬁnding , that such violent acts occurred 
“at least one time” in the calendar year.4 (PCBS 2006)   An initial analysis 
of the survey by the Institute of Women’s Studies for PCBS  noted that 
the aggregate ﬁgure may be misleading in grappling with “the real
extent of domestic violence” (Institute of Women’s Studies 2006) and 
provided additional ﬁgures for women who experience three or more acts
of physical violence from their spouses during the year 2005, ﬁnding
that about 9% (40% of the 23%) of women surveyed experienced this 
level of physical violence.  This is almost one in ten women and is not a 
negligible ﬁgure, but it is obviously important to any assessment to look
at the incidence rate.  Obviously, much more analysis needs to be done.   
PCBS also provides data on types of spousal physical violence 
experienced by women which is not analyzed in the HRW report but 
is also offers a window to understanding the severity of such violence. 
3 Data from the PCBS survey was newly-released as HRW completed its report, which may partially 
explain the lack of analysis.
4 The PCBS survey also considers psychological violence (the most common at 61.7% of married 
women “exposed for at least one time” in 2005) and sexual violence.
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Again, more analysis is needed here, but it is clear that the most common 
acts of physical violence (for married women by spouses) by far were 
pushing strongly (the most prevalent), slapping the face, throwing an 
object  or twisting the arm or pulling hair, while a small (but not to be 
neglected)  minority report possible life-threatening attacks. (PCBS 2006, 
Table 3, 11)  For effective intervention, it is important not to conﬂate all
these acts.  The HRW report suggests this conﬂation by juxtaposition: 
for example, after a paragraph citing the 23% ﬁgure above, it follows
with considering  legal remedies “Palestinian women in violent or life-
threatening marriages….” (p. 36)  
Generally, the report seems to place all such acts, from pushing to 
strangulation,  under the  rubric of “crimes,”  which cannot be helpful in 
developing a  strategy (or even a public discussion) to address criminal 
violence against women and girls.  Here, a better use of the data could 
have been used to explore women’s recourses and remedies.  The report 
is almost certainly right, citing social workers, lawyers and counselors, 
that women are hesitant to seek legal remedies – indeed, the weakness 
of the police and courts under the Palestinian Authority means that many 
Palestinian do not seek recourse there. One of the most useful sections of 
the report is its analysis of discriminatory legislation and the problems of 
police intervention.  However, the very low rate of women in the survey 
who experienced any form of spousal violence and reported it to the 
police (at about 1%) has also to be understood in the context of the types 
and severity of violence experienced, including the fact that the most 
common form reported was psychological.    The fact that many women 
turned to either talking with their husband (43%) or temporarily leaving 
home to a father or brother (40%) makes more sense when the nature 
and extent of the acts of violence are taken into account.    Strengthening 
the access and acceptability of women to legal remedies for abuse,  and 
developing appropriate legal and police capacity, will be more effectively 
undertaken by understanding what kinds of family violence need to be 
addressed by the legal system.   
The HRW report also reﬂects the perceptions of women’s movement
activists and others that violence against Palestinian women and girls 
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is increasing, a perception widely shared but still difﬁcult to prove
statistically.  Given that the 2005 PCBS survey is the ﬁrst national-
level survey, this awaits conﬁrmation. 5 These points are not made to 
quibble and certainly not to diminish the importance of addressing 
domestic violence against Palestinian women and girls. Rather, only by 
understanding the extent, severity and trends by a careful analysis of 
data – and by understanding the resources society may have to offer 
– can effective campaigns and strategies be mounted.
Providing context: what social, political, legal  and economic conditions encourage 
or restrain family violence in Palestine?  How is it related to other forms of 
violence, particularly the  pervasive colonial violence of the Israeli occupation, 
conﬂict, sustained warlike conditions and insecurity? Who is responsible for
addressing violence against Palestinian women and girls?
An Amnesty International report on violence against Palestinian women 
(issued on 31 March 2005) provides a context and offers an implicit 
critique of  the narrow framework of the later HRW document in its title: 
“Conﬂict, occupation and patriarchy:  Women carry the burden.” It is
the ﬁrst two terms – conﬂict and occupation, that are largely missing in
HRW’s approach, while the third, patriarchy, seems to be seen as a ﬁxed,
rather than shifting, social order where Palestinian women are fated to 
subordination.   In contrast, Amnesty surveys violence in its many facets, 
whether at Israeli checkpoints or in the home, by Israeli laws restricting 
marriage or prevailing Jordanian law restricting complaints of abuse.  
The HRW  report acknowledges that domestic violence in Palestine 
may be “aggravated during times of political violence” (p. 3) but offers 
no wider framework that includes the pervasive violence faced by 
Palestinian women from the Israeli occupation and Israel’s siege against 
the Palestinian people. The effect of political and economic crisis on 
social and family relations is largely absent.  In contrast, the Amnesty 
International report notes an important dynamic:  
5 The report’s citation of  an earlier local survey  to provide “evidence that marital rate is prevalent” is 
also somewhat problematic as HRW does not contrast it with the  lower ﬁgures found in the national
level survey. (p. 36)
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“The breakdown of the economic and security situation caused 
by the conﬂict has imposed increased pressure and restrictions
on women, and at the same time it has further curtailed women’s 
ability to control their own lives.”
While “blaming the occupation” for all the social ills in Palestinian 
society would also be unhelpful, the HRW Report isolates domestic 
violence and implicitly gender relations and Palestinian families  from 
all the contexts in which they function.  Such isolation cannot reﬂect
the reality – whether literally, when Palestinians are made homeless by 
Israeli air raids or bulldozers,  or conceptually, as family relations both 
extend into, and are affected by, the political and economic realm. 
As noted above, the HRW report recognizes the weakness of the 
Palestinian Authority but nonetheless states that “the PA holds 
ultimate responsibility for protecting victims and holding perpetrators 
accountable.” (p. 6)   Leaving aside questions of the PA’s criminal 
jurisdiction outside  Area A constituting  the main Palestinian cities,  this 
statement does not acknowledge the responsibility under international 
law of the Israeli occupation an occupation that continues in the period 
covered by the Report.  Here the Amnesty International report makes 
an important distinction between such responsibility by the occupying 
power to implement human rights treaties, and the fact that the PA is 
“best placed” to address family violence against Palestinian women and 
girls which requires a conﬁdence by the victims that is obviously absent
in the case of the Israeli occupation (Amnesty International, 13-14)
Beyond victims: women as agents.  How do we assess women’s status and 
characterize Palestinian society in relation to violence against women and girls? 
How do we approach grave crimes against women and girls?
The report’s brisk and un-nuanced analysis of the status of Palestinian 
women tends to view gender relations and discrimination solely as 
products of patriarchy (and attitudes), rather than political, economic 
and social structures and dynamics.  It thus  offers no explanation, for 
example, of how restricted and gendered labor markets, themselves 
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derived from Israel’s occupation,  shape  women’s low labor force 
participation, although opinion polls (not cited) tend to show that 
a majority of both men and women support women’s work outside 
the home.  An unfortunate use of statistics culled second-hand from 
a Freedom House report reinforces an unrelieved view of women’s 
lack of agency, reinforced by blanket statements like “Male relatives 
(usually their fathers) often arrange marriages for Palestinian girls,” 
(p. 28) disregarding the clear and documented role of mothers in 
marriage arrangements.6 
Most disturbing, is a tendency to make serious crimes against women – 
which unarguably exist – emblematic of society as a whole, a conﬂation
that would probably not occur in approaching such violent crimes in 
a Western society.  “Honor” crimes are thus positioned as a “graphic 
illustration” of society-wide gender discrimination, a statement which is 
uncomfortably close to broader Orientalist depictions of Arab societies. 
Another side of the same coin is to see all Palestinian women as potential 
victims of these crimes as this statement from the HRW report:
A Palestinian women’s life is at risk if she is suspected of 
engaging in behavior her family or community considers taboo, 
such as talking with a man who is not her husband or a blood 
relative (even in a public place, refusing to tell a close male 
relative here she has been and with whim, or marrying someone 
without the approval of her family…” (p. 49)
Many Palestinian women, as well as men, would ﬁnd this statement
not only unreﬂective of their lived experience, but offensive in its
stereotypical generalization.  Just as important, this view seems to 
preclude wider community mobilization to address and prevent such 
serious crimes, leaving punishment, rather than prevention, as the only 
remedy.   In a thoughtful article, An Naim argues that such community 
involvement  discourse is essential:
6  See for example Tuastad 1997 on the role of mothers in marriage arrangements (for sons and daughters) 
in Breij refugee camp.
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Unless one subscribes to the patronizing and authoritarian view 
that people should simply be coerced into ‘doing what is good 
for them,’ it is necessary to gain their cooperation and support 
through an internal discourse within the community around 
cultural norms and institutions associated with these crimes.” 
(An Naim 2005, 65)
Women’s movements and organizations in Palestine have made 
important strides in addressing family violence, including hot-lines, 
counseling, legal advice and cooperative efforts to establish shelters, 
among other initiatives.  The establishment of the Palestinian Violence 
against Women Forum in 2002 provides a space for strategy-making and 
collective action.  Engaging and debating some of the questions raised 
by the new Human Rights report is one way to develop and deepen 
strategies that address violence against Palestinian women and girls in 
all its forms and, hopefully, to develop an internal discourse that can 
complement rights-based approaches.
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Report: Re-Thinking Arab and Palestinian Families:
New Research Agendas and Policy Directions
Chivvis Moore
Researchers from the Institute of Women’s Studies 
have participated in a regional Arab Families 
Working Group since its founding in 2001. On 10 
February 2006, the Institute held a workshop to 
discuss the preliminary ﬁndings from current AFWG
research projects with researchers and activists in 
Palestine, including presentations from Institute 
researchers, as well as visiting scholars.   Chivvis 
Moore, staff member at the Institute, provided the 
following report on the workshop.
How do young people in Hebron view their futures differently from the 
way youth in Ramallah view theirs? 
What new forms of marriage are currently being practiced and what do 
these mean? 
Are Lebanese villagers raising their children with a concept of 
responsibility to the state? And why are Lebanese immigrant parents in 
Canada afraid of the police? 
These kinds of questions, along with many others embracing theoretical 
and methodological concerns, were raised and debated as the Arab 
Families Working Group met with more than 25 local scholars and 
community leaders in a workshop at the Institute of Women’s Studies 
in February.  The Arab Families Working Group (AFWG) was set up 
six years ago because of its founders’ belief in the “absolute centrality 
of families and youth to Arab society,” as Suad Joseph, Professor of 
Anthropology & Women's Studies at the University of California, Davis, 
and workshop chair, explained, as well as because of the scarcity of 
research on Arab families that is “scientiﬁcally and rigorously researched,
empirically sound, and adequately theorized”.  
AFWG members come from the ﬁelds of anthropology, sociology,
history, media studies, and literature, among others; and they live in 
Europe and the US as well as in the Middle East. Their approach is 
collaborative, interdisciplinary, inter-generational, comparative, and 
committed to long-term endeavour.  
Goals are to produce and disseminate research to scholars, planners, 
policy makers, and others; and to engage with other scholars, activists, 
practitioners, NGOs, government ministries, the media, and others 
in the investigation of Arab families. The group wants to “open the 
conversation”, as Joseph put it, and to ask others what they are doing 
on the subject. As group members focus on the impact of war, violent 
displacement, and migration on Arab families and youth, they know 
no methodological constraints: they are using in-depth, qualitative 
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interviews; surveys; archival work; media; the Internet; and other means. 
Results are to be disseminated in both English and Arabic. 
Three Arab countries were selected for the ﬁrst studies, on the basis of
the abundance and quality of research material about them and because 
their differing circumstances made them particularly signiﬁcant for
comparative studies. The countries are Palestine, because of its unique 
“quasi-state formation” under military occupation; Lebanon, because of 
its experience with civil war and reconstruction; and Egypt, because it is 
a highly centralized  state.
Two of the seven presentations centred on Lebanon. One, by Ray 
Jureidini, from the American University in Cairo, was an historical 
study of the relationships between women domestic workers and the 
Lebanese families who employ them. The study concentrates on the 
role that can develop as women servants become “ﬁctive kin”, as they
and then later their children and then their grandchildren establish long-
term relationships with the Lebanese families for whom they work. The 
research on these “families serving families” is being done largely by 
means of in-depth interviews, with not only the domestic worker and her 
employer, but also with other available members of both families.  
Suad Joseph, herself of Lebanese origin, reported on the longitudinal 
research project she began on her return to Lebanon during “the ﬁrst lull”
in the civil war in 1994. It was a time, she recalled, when the country 
was fragmented and the population’s only security came from just two 
sources -- militias and families:  “The idea of Lebanon as a state had 
almost dissolved.” Settling in a Lebanese village, she began to research 
“how parents socialize their children and raise them for citizenship after 
a war ... in the absence of any idea of a public sphere that belonged 
to everyone.” She was interested in how, within such an environment, 
children could be raised with “a sense of national identity and a sense 
of their own rights and responsibilities to their community, their village, 
and their country”. Of the dozen or so families, all with children under 
the age of 10, which Joseph began studying, so many had left Lebanon 
by 2004 that Joseph followed them to the communities in Ottawa and 
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New Jersey where they had settled.  These “transnational families” are 
the subject of her AFWG research project.
The methodological and conceptual questions which arose in the 
discussion following the two presentations on Lebanon were rich in their 
challenge and contribution. Might there be a problem with methodology, 
it was suggested, in the domestic worker study, which was turning up 
“many stories of love,” apparently reciprocal, between the domestic 
workers’ families and the Lebanese families they served? Might exclusive 
reliance on interviews as a research tool mask relationships of exploitation 
and feelings of unexpressed resentment which these relationships must, 
at least in some cases, involve?  Juredini, who has done extensive work 
on contemporary human rights violations of foreign domestic workers 
in Lebanon, responded by acknowledging the difﬁculties and suggesting
methods to probe these important questions.
Regarding her study of Lebanese village families, Joseph reported that 
her interviewees found her questions “almost nonsensical”. When she 
asked about children’s rights, for example, parents were likely to say, 
“They are entitled to everything, to all rights!” Joseph’s conclusion was, 
“I was getting empty answers because the question itself did not make 
sense to them…. The language of rights didn’t translate.” 
Another workshop participant, Rita Giacaman, of Birzeit University’s 
Institute of Community Health, agreed that “The problem is not in the 
questions themselves; the problem is in the concepts and paradigms that 
are used – which [are] very much a function of the West, and which [have] 
very little to do with the goals of socialization ... in the local culture....
Generally speaking, the state is absent, but for a very good material reason. 
Who takes care of the children – their education, health, etc. – and why 
should the family think of raising citizens” when the state is not providing 
for them?  “The real question is: if those concepts don’t work, then how 
do we collectively go about developing the ... concepts and instruments 
that do work” as we go about trying to understand our reality. 
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Interchanges were lively and  responses were not defensive; indeed, one 
was completely disarming. “I don’t have answers to that,” one speaker 
responded frankly to a question put to her. In short, the workshop was 
marked by the very spirit of interdisciplinary and intergenerational 
collaboration that the Arab Families Working Group prizes so highly. 
Throughout, it was made clear that all ﬁndings were preliminary and
tentative, and that the reason they were being presented at all at this stage 
was to garner precisely the kind of feedback the speakers were receiving. 
Three of the presentations on Palestinian families concerned changing 
marriage patterns resulting from the Israeli occupation; and two dealt 
with the desires and ambitions and concepts of rights articulated by 
Palestinian youth. The ﬁve studies on Palestinian families are being
undertaken by members of the Institute of Women’s Studies. 
As part of the AFWG research project entitled “Marriages and Movement: 
Weddings and War,” Penny Johnson described ways in which some 
marriage arrangements and ceremonies observed during the ﬁrst intifada
differ in striking ways from marriages taking place now, during the 
second intifada.  In the case of one marriage that took place during the 
ﬁrst intifada, the bride’s choice of partner was at least partly based on
his high degree of involvement in nationalist activities. The bride, an 
engineering graduate from Birzeit University, dressed simply, wore her 
hair in braids, was married at home, and received a mahr (dowry) of just 
one Jordanian dinar.  “Walla dibleh, walla dahab” (No ring, no gold), 
she exclaimed.
Almost 20 years and another intifada later, a young man from a Ramallah-
area refugee camp, also an engineering graduate from Birzeit University 
and from a nationalist family with a record of sacriﬁce, speciﬁed that the
woman he would marry should have a post-secondary education, be at 
least six years younger than he was, and should not have been employed 
for a long period outside the home. To him, it did not matter whether 
or not his bride was politically active. For the wedding party he rented 
a hall and invited over one thousand guests. Johnson is exploring the 
hypothesis that “the times – politics in its broadest senses as environment, 
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power, resistance, crisis, identity, means of agency and ﬁeld of meaning
– play a critical role in shaping marriage arrangements and ceremonies 
in these two cases, and in Palestinian society as a whole.” 
Investigating another facet of the subject “Weddings and War,” Lamis 
Abu Nahleh related how Israeli military restrictions on mobility are 
limiting the marriage choices of young Palestinians. Citing two recent 
marriages, in which the choice of partners was made for very different 
reasons, Abu Nahleh described her research into the relative importance 
of various factors – conservative or progressive family traditions, 
religion, identiﬁcation with a village or community, and politics – in
determining marriage choices. 
“A new form of marriage” was described by Islah Jad in a third 
investigative thread in the “Weddings and War” research project.  The 
collective marriage, in which large numbers of couples are married 
simultaneously in the same place is most characteristically sponsored 
by Islamist organizations, Jad said, but has also been deployed by 
the main-stream Fateh movement.  This development is signiﬁcant
on several levels – the political,  for its combination of religious and 
nationalist symbols, expressing the “Islamisation of society;”  the social 
level, where its austerity acts to reduce expenses and to combat class 
distinctions, and where it represents a shift in gender relations; and the 
sexual level, where in some cases polygamous marriages are included 
with the rationale of containing male sexual desire.
Finally, perspectives of contemporary Palestinian youth were addressed 
in presentations by Eileen Kuttab and Randa Nasser. Using a combination 
of research methodologies, including surveys and polls, interviews, and 
participatory observation, Kuttab’s study suggests that, while Palestinian 
youth in general “don’t have real hopes for the future”, youth at Birzeit 
and Bethlehem Universities tend to speak more about issues relating 
to freedom and democracy, while youth in Hebron express greater 
ease with the mores of traditional Muslim communities and do not 
refer to issues of personal freedom. Nasser’s study, which replicates at 
Birzeit University an earlier study of Joseph’s with Lebanese children, 
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investigates students’ views of their rights, and ﬁnds Birzeit students
more concerned with civil, political and social rights than with basic 
survival needs. 
Again, other workshop participants ventured cautionary responses. 
Beware of comparing the two intifadas, one warned. In doing this, we 
are comparing two different societies, two different generations. In the 
second, the gap between rich and poor has widened and the national 
project has been lost, in comparison to the hopeful era of the ﬁrst
intifada. It’s important to examine just who is inﬂuencing the views
of Palestinian youth, suggested several others. Is it families, and if so, 
what kinds of families – nuclear or extended, and where? Is it NGOs, 
media, popular songs, fashion, mosques and churches, civic education 
in schools or universities? To what degree is the outlook of Palestinian 
youth determined by class? Another person asked: “If we are changing 
people’s concept of rights, then aren’t we shifting also their sense of who 
the authority is? And if we are shifting the sense of authority from state 
to family, and both these are patriarchal, then what kind of shift are we 
affecting?”
“We assume,” said Joseph, that once we’ve got a concept – like the 
concept of marriage, or of citizen’s rights -- that the concept is stable. 
What we are realizing is the fundamental instability of conceptual tools.... 
Not only do our concepts not work well when transferred from West to 
East; they don’t even work in our own areas over time.” 
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